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I. INTRODUCTION

The United States is not usually regarded as a timid prosecutor.' Indeed,
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Puget Sound School of Law; J.D., Harvard Law School,
1986; B.A., Yale University, 1982; Attorney-Adviser, U.S. Department of State, 1987-1991. I would like
to thank Sean D. Murphy of the U.S. Department of State and Professors Janet Ainsworth, Eric
Chippianelli, Sid DeLong, David Skover, and John Weaver of the University of Puget Sound School of
Law for their helpful comments on this article.
1. See, e.g., Warren Richey, Noriega'sOuster CarriesHefty Price Tag, CHI. TRM., Sept. 8, 1991,
at C27 (quoting Professor Fletcher Baldwin's view that prosecution of General Manuel Noriega is
'reprehensible overkill" involving "the most expensive execution of a search warrant ever"); Ruth Marcus,
Marcos Case IllustratesLongerReachof U.S. Law: NationalBoundariesLess of an Obstacle, WASH. POST,
Oct. 26, 1988, at A4 (reporting experts' view that prosecution of former President Ferdinand Marcos
"reflects the increasingly international reach of U.S.. criminal law'). But see Anthony Chase, Aspects of
ExtraterritorialCriminalJurisdictionin Anglo-American Practice, 11 INT'L LAW. 555 (1977) (discussing
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U.S. enthusiasm for extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction has prompted criticism
that "a proselytizing spirit" and a "sense of imperial mission" motivate U.S.
practice.2 Nevertheless, the United States is one of the least aggressive proponents of one of the most widely accepted forms of extraterritorial jurisdiction:
nationality-based criminal jurisdiction, or criminal jurisdiction based on the
nationality of the offender.' Consequently, when a U.S. national 4 commits
a violent crime in a state that subsequently does not prosecute, the U.S.
offender avoids prosecution altogether because the United States lacks jurisdiction. This jurisdictional gap is not hypothetical; it prevents prosecution of a
number of serious cases every year.5
Several factors may prevent the host state, the state in which the U.S.

national commits a serious crime, from prosecuting. First, extradition back to
the host state may be impossible if the U.S. offender flees home, since U.S.
law forbids extradition in the absence of an extradition treaty.6 The United
States has no effective extradition treaty with dozens of countries.7 In a recent
example, Korea requested the extradition from the United States of a U.S.
national suspected of murder in Korea. The United States refused to extradite

"Case of the Curiously Reluctant Prosecutor").
2. A.D. NEALE & M.L. STEPHENS, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND NATIONAL JURISDICTION 208

(1988).
3. See, e.g., RESTATM MNT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
402(2) & reporters' note 1 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT] (noting wide acceptance of nationality
jurisdiction and "sparing" application of principle in U.S. law).
4. The term "U.S. national" refers to U.S. citizens and noncitizens who owe allegiance to the United
States. Although often used interchangeably, "citizenship" is exclusively a concept of national law, while
"nationality" is a concept of both international and national law. See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22) (1988); RESTATEiENT, supra note 3, §§ 211-213. For materials on the exercise of
jurisdiction over legal persons such as corporations, see generally RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 414;
A.V. LowE, EXTRATERRITORIALJutRSDICnTON (1983); KennethW. Damm,Extraterritorialityand
Conflicts
of Jurisdiction, 1983 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 370.
5. See, e.g., 137 CoNG. REc. S4750 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 1991) (statement of Sen. Hollings); Military
Cooperationwith CivilianLawEnforcement:HearingBeforethe
Subcomm. on Crimeof theHouse Judiciary
Comm., 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1985) [hereinafter Hearing on Law Enforcement] (statement of Rep.
Rangel) (reporting that 422 "major offenses" were committed by civilian employees and dependents of
military personnel in 1977, and host state declined to prosecute in 136 of those cases); OperationofArticle
VII of the NATO Status of ForcesTreaty: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on NATO Status of Forces of the
Senate Armed Services Comm., 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1970) [hereinafter 1970 SOFA Hearing]; U.S.

GAO, Report to the Congressof the United States: Some CriminalOffenses Committed Overseasby DOD
CiviliansAre Not Being Prosecuted:LegislationIs Needed 12 (Sept. 11, 1979) [hereinafter GAO Report]
(noting most military police, lawyers, and commanders believe many crimes are committed by civilian
employees and dependents "with the full knowledge that there is no U.S. criminal jurisdiction," and that
this is a matter of "serious concern'); G.I.A.D. DRAPER, CIVILIANS AND THE NATO STATUS OF FORCES
AGREEMENT 115, 140-41 (1966); Gregory A. McClelland, The Problem of Jurisdiction Over Civilians

Accompanying the ForcesOverseas-Stillwith Us, 117 MIL. L. REv. 167, 180 (1987) (noting that 53 of
415 serious civilian cases not prosecuted by host state).
6. See Valentine v. United States e rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 8-9 (1936) (U.S. Constitution forbids
extradition in absence of treaty or statute). Proposals to abolish the treaty requirement are discussed below.
See infra text accompanying note 119.
7. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES INFORCE 138, 193, 206 (Jan. 1, 1989) (Korea, the

Philippines, Saudi Arabia).
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the accused for lack of an extradition treaty, and did not prosecute for lack of
jurisdiction.8
Second, even if the host state can obtain custody of the suspect, it may be
unable or unwilling to prosecute. The host state may be unable to prosecute
because the offender has diplomatic immunity. Or the host state may simply
be unwilling to prosecute because it expects the United States to take jurisdiction. This often occurs when a civilian dependent of a U.S. soldier stationed
overseas commits a crime against a U.S. or other foreign national, since status
of armed forces agreements often place primary responsibility for prosecution
on the United States in such circumstances. 9 However, constitutional protections prevent the United States from trying civilian dependents in U.S. courtsmartial as currently configured. Although host states do prosecute most crimes
committed by U.S. civilian dependents abroad, a significant number of serious
crimes go unprosecuted every year. 0
International law recognizes five bases for extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction: the nationality principle, the territorial effects principle, the protective
principle, the universal principle, and the passive personality principle. Of
these, only the nationality principle-which the United States generally rejects-would allow the United States to prosecute one of its nationals for a
violent crime committed abroad. While the territorial effects (or "objective
territorial") principle allows a state to regulate activity abroad if it affects that
state's territory, this principle ordinarily does not justify prosecution of violent
crimes committed abroad." The protective principle applies to treason, espionage and other crimes directly affecting the state's security, but not to ordinary
crimes, such as murder and assault, which do not directly threaten the home
state's security."2 The universal principle permits a state to prosecute crimes
against humanity regardless of where they are committed, but not common

8. See 137 CoNG. Rc. 4752 (1991) (statement of Sen. Hollings) (reprinting letter of Assistant
Secretary Janet G. Mullins, U.S. Department of State, requesting extradition); OregonianReturns Home
After Five Months in Korean Prison, UPI, Jan. 1, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, Wires file

[hereinafter OregonianReturns Home]. The author had some responsibility for this case while working
at the State Department.
9. See Operation of Article VII, NATO Status of Forces Treaty: Hearing Before a Subcom. of the
Senate Armed Services Comm., 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-15 (1965) [hereinafter 1965 SOFA Hearing]

(reporting that in one six-month period, foreign states prosecuted civilian dependents in only 222 of 1,178
possible cases); see also discussion infra note 72 and accompanying text.
10. See supranote 5.
11. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 300-02 (3d ed. 1979); cf.
DIETER LANGE & GARY BORN, THE EXTRATERRrrTORIAL APPLICATION OF NATIONAL LAWS 36-37 (1987)
(criticizing U.S. application of "territorial effects" principle).
Moreover, the territorial effects principle is not normally considered to apply to acts merely because

they may affect the foreign relations of the home state. Instead, such acts are prosecutable under the
nationality principle.
12. See generally Monika B. Krizek, Note, The Protective Principleof ExtraterritorialJurisdiction:
A BriefHistoryand an Application of the Principleto Espionage asan Illustrationof CurrentUnited States

Practice,6 B.U. INT'L L.J. 337 (1988).
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crimes. t3 The final and most controversial basis of jurisdiction, the passive
personality principle, permits a state to exercise jurisdiction because the victim
was a national of that state. This basis would not cover the murder of a
foreigner by a U.S. national. Until recently, the United States, like most states,
expressed reluctance to base jurisdiction on this principle. 14
Thus, when a host state does not prosecute a U.S. national who commits
a violent crime abroad, the United States does not exercise jurisdiction. Should
the United States eschew nationality jurisdiction, when it may provide the only
basis for prosecution? Part II of this article traces the evolution of nationalitybased criminal jurisdiction in U.S. law and asserts that the United States has
in fact embraced such jurisdiction in the past, usually to ensure that U.S.
offenders abroad were tried by U.S. courts rather than foreign tribunals. Part
III examines the current U.S. jurisdictional scheme, which relies on foreign
states to prosecute U.S. offenders abroad, and concludes that the scheme is
inadequate because foreign states often cannot or will not prosecute. Part In
further argues that only nationality-based jurisdiction could extend to all crimes
committed by U.S. nationals abroad. Part IV asserts that the establishment of
nationality-based criminal jurisdiction would be consistent with the U.S.
Constitution and with international law. Finally, Part V sets forth practical
considerations that should inform the establishment and exercise of nationalitybased criminal jurisdiction.
H. THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONALITY-BASED CRIMINAL JURISDICTION IN

U.S. LAW
A. Early U.S. Practice
Early U.S. criminal jurisdiction relied very little on nationality jurisdiction,
or on any form of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Instead, early U.S. criminal
jurisdiction was primarily territorial. The Founders expected the United States

13. See Kenneth C. Randall, UniversalJurisdiction Under InternationalLaw, 66 TEX. L. REV. 785,

839 (1988) (noting universal jurisdiction extends only to "piracy, slave trading, war crimes, hijacking and
sabotage of aircraft, hostage-taking, crimes against internationally protected persons, apartheid, torture,
and genocide").

14. See generally RESTATEMNT, supra note 3, § 402 cmt. g (passive personality principle has not
been widely accepted with respect to ordinary crimes). Part III below discusses a recent congressional
proposal to exercise passive personality jurisdiction over murder of U.S. nationals abroad.
For more on these five principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction, see Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 820-59 (2d ed. 1987); HARVARD RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL

LAW, Draft Convention on Jurisdictionwith Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 439, 480-508 (Supp.
1935) [hereinafter Harvard Research]; B.J. George, Jr., ExtraterritorialApplicationof Penal Legislation,

64 MICH. L. REV. 609, 613-15 (1966).
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to exercise criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed inU.S. territory, 5
or on U.S. flag vessels on the high seas. 6 Since the United States adhered
to the territorial principle, the U.S. government naturally chose not to prosecute U.S. nationals for crimes they committed abroad.'"
The United States inherited its devotion to territorial criminal jurisdiction
from England,"8 and this devotion reflected the conviction that the exercise
of extraterritorial jurisdiction would intrude on the sovereignty of a state in
which an offense occurred.' 9 Reflecting this view, the Declaration of Independence criticized George III for "[t]ransporting us beyond Seas to be tried for
pretended Offenses."2 0 Territoriality promoted the common law ideal of
confrontation in criminal cases by ensuring that suspects would face trial near
the scene of the crime, where witnesses and evidence were more readily
available. According to this ideal, a prosecution far from the scene of the
crime not only inconvenienced witnesses2 ' but was also unfair to defendants.' Moreover, it seemed unfair to require nationals to answer to two
sovereigns while abroad (i.e., the laws of both the United States and the host

15. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, U.S. Law Enforcement Abroad: The Constitution and International
Law, 83 AM. J. INT'LL. 880, 883 (1989) (discussing history); Note, Constructingthe State Extraterritorially:JurisdictionalDiscourse,the NationalInterest, and TransnationalNorms, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1273,
1276 (1990) (same).
16. Although flag statejurisdiction can be understood as a species of nationality jurisdiction, the U.S.
Supreme Court has long maintained the "mischievous fiction" that a ship is a "floating part of the flagstate." Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 585 (1953) (footnote omitted); see also United States v. Flores,
289 U.S. 137, 155-59 (1933); S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A.) No. 10 (Sept. 7, 1928).
17. See LowenfeId, supranote 15, at 883 (noting early Congresses rarely established nationality-based
jurisdiction, and executive and judiciary rarely enforced it); accordNote, supranote 15, at 1276.
18. See generally JOHN WESTLAKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: PART I-PEACE 252-53 (1910) (English
common law fully and exclusively adopted the territoriality principle).
19. "A government would feel, with respect to offenses committed abroad in a civilized country, that
it was, at the best, undertaking a work of supererogation; perhaps that it was interfering in a matter which,
as the law of the place provided for it, would most properly be left alone." JOHN BASSErr MOORE, U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, REPORT ON EXTRATERRITORIAL CRIME AND THE CUTTING CASE 101 (1887).
20. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCEpara. 21 (U.S. 1776). Before independence, the American
colonies repeatedly called on Parliament to repeal the act of Parliament permitting courts in England to
try anyone who committed a crime in America. See, e.g., Resolution of Oct. 14, 1774, in 1 JOURNALS
OF TiE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 62, 65 (1774) (resolving that colonies are entitled to common law of
England and "more especially to the great and inestimable privilege of being tried by their peers of the
vicinage, according to the course of that law"); Petition of Congress to the King's Most Excellent Majesty
(Nov. 18, 1774), reprintedin id. at 115, 117.
21. -[Who does his majesty think can be prevailed on to cross the Atlantick for the sole purpose of
bearing evidence to a fact?" Thomas Jefferson, Draft of Instructions to the Virginia Delegates in the
Continental Congress (1774), in 1 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 128 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950)
[hereinafter JEFFERSON].
22. "And the wretched criminal . . . stripped of his privilege of trial by peers, of his vicinage,
removed from the place where alone full evidence could be obtained, without money, without counsel,
without friends, without exculpatory proof, is tried before judges predetermined to condemn." Id. at 128-29.
Cf.U.S. CONsT. amend. VI (establishing rights to trial where crime occurred, to confrontation of witnesses,
and to counsel).
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state). 3 Finally,, these common law based aversions to nationality jurisdiction
meshed nicely with the new U.S. brand of federalism, which relied upon each
of the several states to prosecute violent crimes occurring within its territory.24 By eschewing the nationality principle, the federal government could
thus rely on other sovereigns to prosecute all ordinary crimes: the several
states for domestic crimes and foreign states for foreign crimes.'
The traditional common law view contrasted with the emerging view in
civil law states such as France, which in 1795 established jurisdiction over all
French nationals who committed serious crimes outside of France.2 6 Nationality-based jurisdiction traced its roots to ancient times, when territorial boundaries were often vague, and communities were defined by "the religion, race
or the nationality of the people rather than [by] the territory." 27 Thus "there
was a King of the English rather than a King of England. "28 The ancient
Egyptians, Babylonians, Greeks, and Romans all exercised some form of
extraterritorial jurisdiction based on principles included in the modern concept
of the nationality principle.' Feudal states adopted a more strictly territorial
23. "The system of tying the entire criminal law of a country round the neck of a subject, and of
making him liable to its operations, in whatever part of the world he may be, converts the criminal law
[11f
the criminal law were a personal statute a foreigner would at the same
into a personal statute ....
time be subject to two criminal laws-the criminal law of his own state and that of the state of his
domicile.* 1 JEFFERSON, supra note 21, at 100.
24. The Constitution did not grant Congress the power to prosecute such "local" crimes. Instead, it
left prosecution to the states, at least for common crimes occurring within the several states. See Perez
v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 158 (1971) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ('The definition and prosecution of
local, intrastate crime are reserved to the States under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments."); LouIs HENKIN,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CoNSTrrUTION 75 (1972). Similarly, in civil matters, the Anglo-American
tradition "generally looks to residence or domicile rather than to nationality." RESTATEMENT, supra note
3, § 402 reporters' note 1.
The several states have some power to legislate extraterritorially. See George, supra note 14, at 617.
The states have legislated and enforced their criminal laws extraterritorially-usually on the basis of the
territorial effects or the protective principle. See HARVARD RESEARCH, supra note 14, at 527. For example,
Virginia at one time exercised jurisdiction over felonies committed by Virginians against other Virginians
abroad-a foray into the dark forest of both nationality and passive personality jurisdiction. Id. The statute
was applied at least once, in Commonwealth v. Gaines, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 172 (1819). HARVARD
RESEARCH, supra note 14, at 52.
25. One notable exception to this regime of deference to other sovereigns has been federal regulation
of major crimes in Indian territory. See Indian Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1988) (establishing
federal jurisdiction over major crimes committed in Indian territory).
26. See Code de 3 brumaire an 4, art. 11 (Oct. 23, 1795), reprinted in ROBERT W. RAFUSE, THE
ExTRADIrIoN OF NATIONALS 135 (1939). See also id. at 139-41 (summarizing statutes establishing
extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction based on nationality); Royal French Edict of June, 1778, Regulating
the Judicial Functions of French Consuls in the Levant and the Barbary States, reprintedin S. Misc. Doc.
No. 89, 47th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1882) (noting that French consuls could conduct criminal prosecutions
of French subjects); 1 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A TREATISE ON EXTRADrION AND INTERSTATE RENDITION
§ 7, at 11 (1891) (asserting that 1777 Franco-Swiss extradition agreement did not require extradition of
nationals because both countries prosecuted their nationals for crimes committed abroad).
27. Shalom Kassan, ExtraterritorialJurisdiction in the Ancient World, 29 AM. J.INT'L L. 237, 240
(1935).
28. H.R. Doc. No. 326, 59th Cong., 2d Sess. 197 (1906).
29. See Kassan, supra note 27, at 241-47; see also G. BM RAVNDAL, THE ORIcIN OF THE CArrtULATIONS AND OF THE CONSULAR INSTrrTUTION, S. Doc. No. 34, 67th Cong., IstSess. 3-8 (1921). Aeschylus
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approach to law that endured until the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
when the civil law states of the continent reestablished extraterritorial jurisdic-

tion based on nationality." The civil law states, more tolerant of hearsay and
thus more willing to receive deposition testimony than their common law
counterparts, also proved more receptive to nationality-based jurisdiction, since
their less strict evidentiary rules made a long-distance trial more feasible. 3
Although the United States based its jurisdictional system on the territorial
principle, this reliance was not exclusive. For example, the first crime listed
in the first crime bill enacted by the first Congress in 178932 provided that
"[elvery person owing allegiance to the United States, who levies war against
them, or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the
' This provision clearly
United States or elsewhere, is guilty of treason."33

contains an element of nationality-based jurisdiction, for it applies only to a
person "owing allegiance" to the United States.34 This provision may also rely
on the protective principle, since it protects U.S. security and does not apply
to treasonous acts against other sovereigns. Similarly, chapter nine of the first

crime bill outlawed certain forms of piracy by U.S. nationals, 3" thus also
incorporating an element of nationality jurisdiction.36 Jurisdiction over piracy,
however, is generally described as a form of universal jurisdiction, since

was familiar with the concept: "If the sons of Egypt exercise controul over you, maintaining that they are

authorised to do so by the law of the state, as being the nearest alliedby blood, who can resist them? It
is for you to prove that, according to the laws of your country, they have no authority over you."
AESCHYLUS, THE TRAGEDY OF THE SUPPLIANTs, quoted in HuGo GROTIUs, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND

PEACE 261 (Hyperion 1979) (1901) (emphasis added).
30. See generally EDWIN M. BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD 3-32
(reprint 1970) (1915); RAFIJSE, supranote 26, at 135-43 (describing decline and revival of nationality-based
jurisdiction in civil law states of Europe).
31. European states generally continue to refuse to extradite their nationals, promising instead to
prosecute them for crimes committed abroad. See, e.g., HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note
14, at 836 (citing examples from German and French penal codes); SATYA DEVA BEDI, EXTRADITION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 94 (1968).
32. See David K. Watson, Growth of the CriminalLaw of the UnitedStates, in H.R. Doc. No. 362,
57th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 4 (1902) (address delivered to Columbian Law School in Washington, D.C.)
(discussing Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112 (1790)
[hereinafter Act of Apr. 30, 1790]).
33. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, supra note 32, ch. 9 (emphasis added).
34. See Immigration and Naturalization Act, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(22) (West Supp. 1991) (defining
U.S. national as either citizen or a noncitizen who "owes permanent allegianceto the United States"); Bruce
Zagaris & Jay Rosenthal, United States JurisdictionalConsiderationsin InternationalCriminal Law, 15
CAL. W. INT'L. L.J. 303, 308-09 (1985); cf. J.W. Hall, William Joyce: 1945, in FAMOUs TRIALs 346,
363 (Harry Hodge et al. eds., 1961) (suggesting that alien may owe "allegiance" to Britain if she holds
British passport, even if obtained by mistake or fraud).
35. See Act of Apr. 30, 1790, supranote 32, ch. 9.
36. Chapter 9 was not invoked as often as chapter 8 of the same act, since the application of chapter
8 was not limited to U.S. nationals. See United States v. Klintock, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 144, 152 (1820).
Cf. United States v. Davis, 25 F. Cas. 786 (C.C.D. Mass. 1837) (No. 14,932) (offense by U.S. national
on non-piratical vessel was not cognizable).
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piracy is an offense against all nations. 7 Finally, the Logan Act,"8 which
prohibits all U.S. nationals at home or abroad from engaging in diplomatic
correspondence with foreign governments, relies on both the nationality and
the protective principles, as it applies only to U.S. nationals and seeks to

protect national security.39
The young U.S. government also exercised nationality-based criminal
jurisdiction over U.S. civilians who accompanied military personnel abroad.
This practice began during the War of Independence, when the Continental

Congress adopted its Articles of War for the Continental Army. The Articles
included a "camp follower" rule based on British practice, subjecting civilians
to military jurisdiction when they served with the army in the field. 4"
As early as 1782, the United States experimented with the idea of vesting
its consuls in France with jurisdiction to try U.S. nationals for crimes committed in France. This idea did not originate in the United States: the French,
seeking to protect their commercial interests, pressured the U.S. government
to formalize existing consular relations, while state officials stoutly opposed
giving more power to French consuls. 4 Anxious to please its French ally,
Congress authorized Benjamin Franklin to negotiate a consular convention with
France along the lines of the plan proposed by the French government.42
Article 13 of the plan placed "offences committed in France by a citizen of
the United States, against a citizen of the United States" under the jurisdiction
of the U.S. consuls in France, and placed similar offenses committed by
French nationals in the United States under the jurisdiction of French consuls
37. Klintock, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 152; see also United States v. Holmes, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 412
(1820). For more on piracy in U.S. courts, see INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BUREAU, PIRACY AT SEA (Eric
Ellen ed., 1989); ALFRED P. RuBIN, THE LAW OF PIRACY (1988).
38. Act of Jan. 30, 1799, ch. 1, 1 Stat. 613 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 953 (1988)).
39. There are other examples of early criminal statutes based on nationality jurisdiction. In 1797, for
example, Congress forbade U.S. nationals to fit out privateers outside U.S. territory for use against friendly
foreign powers or against U.S. nationals. Congress repealed the law in 1909. See Alfred P. Rubin, he
Concept ofNeutralityin InternationalLaw,16 DEN. J. INT'LL. & PoY'Y 353, 368 (citing2 FRANCls DEAK
& PHIEL C. JEssup, NEUTRALrrY LAWS, RErULATIONS AND TREATIES 1083 (1988)). Congress forbade
any U.S. national to hold property in a vessel engaged in the slave trade (Act of May 10, 1800, 2 Stat.
70), and in 1818, Congress prohibited nationals from taking on board, receiving, or transporting any
negro, mulatto, or person of colour" from Africa (Act of Apr. 20, 1818, 3 Stat. 451, § 4).
40. See Articles of War (1775), arts. XXXII, XLVIII, reprintedin 2 JoURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGREsS 111, 116, 119 (1st ed. 1775); see also Robert Girard, The Constitution and Court-Martialof
CivilansAccompanyingthe ArmedForces-A PreliminaryAnalysis,13 STAN. L. REV. 461,482-83 (1961).
Although this practice was originally confined to civilians "on active service," it was eventually expanded
to permit trials of wagon drivers, suppliers, and, in remote areas where civilian courts were not available,
civilian dependents of military personnel. Id. at 483-84. Until the twentieth century, however, military
tribunals exercisedjurisdiction over civilian dependents principally in time of war. See DRAPER, supra note
5, at 113-15.
41. See The ConsularConvention of.1788, in 14 JEFFER ON, supra note 21, at 166-92. French consuls
monitored U.S. trade with the French West Indies and deterred desertions from French ships visiting U.S.
ports. Not surprisingly, the United States "feared that political surveillance was a chief object of French
consuls in America." Id. at 68.
42. Resolution of January 25, 1782, in 3 SECRET JOURNALS OF CONGRESS 76 (Ist ed. 1782).
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in the United States.43 This arrangement for consular jurisdiction, in which
a consul exercised exclusive jurisdiction over nationals of the consul's home
state, incorporated a combination of the nationality and passive personality
principles of jurisdiction.'
45
B. Nineteenth-Century Practice:The Rise of ConsularJurisdiction

United States experimentation with consular jurisdiction grew into an
enthusiastic embrace during the nineteenth century. The expansion ofjurisdiction was at first confined to the civil sphere: the United States obtained extraterritorial rights in civil matters from a number of Moslem states, including
Morocco (1787), Algiers (1795), Tunis (1797), Tripoli (1805), and Muscat
(1833)." These agreements typically provided that the U.S. consul would
judge all disputes between U.S. nationals and would serve on a mixed court
in disputes between U.S. and local nationals. The consul could not adjudicate
trials of U.S. nationals in criminal as opposed to civil matters but could merely
"be present" or perhaps assist in the domestic adjudication.47
As its commercial interests abroad became more extensive, however, the
United States began to insist on retaining exclusive jurisdiction over U.S.
nationals suspected of crimes abroad. The United States concluded a treaty
with the Ottoman Empire in 1830 that permitted the United States to exercise
jurisdiction over U.S. nationals in Turkey, but did not permit the Ottomans

43. See id. A committee report issued before adoption of the scheme criticized the approach to
jurisdiction proposed in article 13. See 22 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 40,
at27 n.1. The consular jurisdiction proposed by the French in article 13 remained on the table for several
years. See id.
44. Other provisions established extraterritorialjurisdiction in certain civil matters, as well as flag-state
jurisdiction over vessels. Eventually, however, the United States and France amended the provision to
provide simply that the host state would exercise criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed by foreigners.
See Convention on the Functions and Privileges of Consuls and Vice Consuls, Nov. 14, 1798, U.S.-Fr.,
arts. 8-12, 7 Bevans 794.
45. "Extraterritoriality" is the term traditionally used to describe arrangements in which the western
powers obtained exclusive and nonreciprocal jurisdiction over their nationals in foreign countries. To avoid
confusion between "extraterritorialjurisdiction" and "extraterritoriality," which refers only to one specific
manifestation of extraterritorial jurisdiction, this article will use the term "consular jurisdiction" instead
of "extraterritoriality."
46. See Letter from Frederick T. Frelinghuysen, Secretary of State, to Hon. William Windom,
Chairman Committee on Foreign Relations, in S. MIsc. Doc. No. 89, supranote 26, at204-09 (summarizing relevant treaty provisions); H.R. Doc. No. 326, supra note 28, at 214-15 (same); Treaty of Peace and
Friendship, July 18, 1787, U.S.-Morocco, art. XX, reprintedin 5 SECRET JOURNALS OF CONGRESS, supra
note 42, at 350, 357.
47. See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship and Commerce, Jan. 17, 1878, U.S.-Samoa, art. IV, 11 Bevans
437; Treaty of Friendship and Commerce, Dec. 13, 1856, U.S.-Persia, art. V(1), 8 Bevans 1254; Treaty
of Peace and Friendship, Sept. 16, 1836, U.S.-Morocco, art. XXI, 9 Bevans 1286; Treaty of Amity and
Commerce, Sept. 21, 1833, U.S.-Muscat, art. IX, 9 Bevans 1291; Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and
Navigation, Aug. 28, 1797, U.S.-Tunis, art. XXI, 11 Bevans 1088;. see also S. MIsc. Doc. No. 89, supra
note 26, at 204-09 (discussing relevant provisions of these treaties).

Yale Journal of International Law

Vol. 17:41, 1992

to exercise similar jurisdiction over Ottoman subjects in the United States.48
The United States entered into similar arrangements with other countries,
including China (1844), 49 Borneo (1850)," Persia (1856),1 t Japan
(1857),52 Madagascar (1867), 5' Samoa (1878), s4 and Tonga (1886)." s
The United States explicitly used consular jurisdiction to intrude upon
foreign sovereignty in order to protect U.S. commercial interests, 56 a form
of legal imperialism that some scholars and policymakers justified by arguing
that "barbarous lands" did not enjoy full sovereignty because "local law" did
not "exist" in "barbarous lands. "' Others argued that consular jurisdiction
was not demeaning, since it codified enlightened Roman concepts of jurisdiction based on nationality rather than territory.5 8 Still others conceded the onesided nature of consular jurisdiction but viewed it as a "necessary evil," since
"neither Americans nor the citizens of any other civilized power would consent
to live in Turkey [or other countries ruled by Islamic law] if they were not
under the shelter and protection of such treaties. "'

48. See Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, May 7, 1830, U.S.-Ottoman Empire, art. IV, 10 Bevans
619.
49. See Treaty of Peace, Amity and Commerce, July 3, 1844, U.S.-China, art. XXI, 6 Bevans 647.
For more on consular jurisdiction in China, see ELBERT D. THoMAs, EXTRATERRrTORIALITY IN CHINA,
S. Doc. No. 102, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943); JOHN K. FAiRBANK, THE UNITED STATES AND CHNA
161-71, 237, 248 (4th ed. 1983); Crawford M. Bishop, American ExtraterritorialJurisdictionin China,
20 AM. J. INT'L L. 281 (1926); Harold S. Quigley, Extraterritoialityin China, 20 AM. J. INT'L L. 46
(1926).
In 1844, the year the United States obtained extraterritorial rights from China, Secretary of State
Calhoun reaffirmed the myth of exclusive territorial jurisdiction, declaring that "the criminal jurisdiction
ofa nation is limited to its own dominions and to vessels under its flag on the high seas, and.., it cannot
extend it to acts committed within the dominion of another without violating its sovereignty and independence." Letter from Secretary of State Calhoun to Mr. Everett (Sept. 25, 1844), in MOORE, supra note
19, at 113.
50. See U.S.-Borneo Treaty, June 23, 1850, art. IX, excerpted in H.R. Doc. No. 326, supra note
28, at 214.
51. See Treaty of Friendship and Commerce, Dec. 13, 1856, U.S.-Persia, art. V, 8 Bevans 1254.
52. See Treaty on Rights of American Citizens in Japan, June 17, 1857, U.S.-Japan, art. IV, 9 Bevans
359.
53. See Treaty of Commerce, Feb. 14, 1867, U.S.-Madag., art. V, 9 Bevans 742.
54. See Treaty of Friendship and Commerce, Jan. 17, 1878, U.S.-Samoa, art. IV, 11 Bevans 437.
55. See Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, Oct. 2, 1886, U.S.-Tonga, art. XII, 11 Bevans
1043. See generally H.R. Doc. No. 326, supra note 28, at 214-22 (excerpting relevant provisions); S.
Misc. Doc. No. 89, supra note 26, at 204-09 (same).
56. See In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 480 (1891); H.R. Doc. No. 326, supra note 28, at 199; PHILIP
M. BROWN, FOREIGNERS IN TURKEY 3 (1914).
57. MOORE, supra note 19, at 35; see also Letter from Secretary of State Frederick T. Frelinghuysen
to William Windom, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Apr. 29, 1882), in S. Misc.
Doc. No. 89, supra note 26, at 2 (arguing that state of Turkish justice system necessitated exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction over U.S. nationals in Turkey).
58. See, e.g., BROWN, supranote 56, at 4 (arguing that privileged status of foreigners was not "bitter
humiliation" for Ottoman emperor, but rather "much to his credit," since it reflected "more enlightened"
interpretation of law of nations).
59. Edwin Pears, Legal Opinion on the NaturalizationTreaty between the United States and Turkey,
1887 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1109, 1112.
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Congress actively supported adoption of treaties establishing consular
jurisdiction. 6° In 1848, for example, Congress passed legislation that established jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters over U.S. nationals in countries
in which the United States had been granted extraterritorial rights, such as
China and Turkey.6 1 Congressional amendments in 1860 broadened the scope
of consular jurisdiction by granting the consular courts jurisdiction to hear
disputes in admiralty and equity, and by establishing more detailed rules of
civil and criminal procedure. These amendments also extended consular
jurisdiction to most countries in which the United States might exercise extraterritorial rights in the future. 62
In addition, the Senate ratified treaties establishing consular jurisdiction,63
even though some Senators raised questions about the constitutionality of
consular courts. Senator Jones, for example, argued that the United States
could empower consuls to try U.S. nationals for violations of host-country
laws, but could not enforce U.S. law abroad because the Constitution has "no
extraterritorial operation" and enforcement of U.S. law on foreign soil could
create a "clash of jurisdiction." 64 Senator Ingalls objected because the rules
of consular courts allowed as few as three jurors in criminal cases. 65 Yet
another Senator noted that the U.S. consular court in Shanghai had tried,
convicted, and hanged a man without indictment or trial by jury, and that
another man had been sentenced to death in Nagasaki under similar circumstances.66 In reply, proponents of consular trials argued that nationals had no

60. But while Congress accepted exclusive jurisdiction over nationals by U.S. consuls, it never
seriously considered authorizing courts in the United States to try U.S. nationals for ordinary crimes of
violence committed abroad. Congressional materials from the mid-eighteenth century to the mid-twentieth
century reveal little evidence that Congress ever considered legislation establishing nationality jurisdiction
over a broad range of crimes committed abroad. Congress did occasionally commission studies of
extraterritorial jurisdiction, which invariably reported that Congress had the power to enact nationality
jurisdiction but that the difficulty in obtaining witnesses and evidence from overseas made it impractical.
E.g., H.R. REP. No. 1652, 56th Cong, 1st Sess. 1 (1900). Beginning in the 1960s, Congress periodically
entertained legislation to establish nationality-based criminal jurisdiction over civilian dependents of U.S.
military personnel overseas. See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
In extradition practice the United States pressed its treaty partners to agree to the mutual extradition
of their nationals, rather than the exercise of nationality-based jurisdiction. Indeed, during extradition
negotiations with Switzerland, Secretary of State Buchanan argued to the Swiss that exemption of nationals
was unwise not only because U.S. courts presently lacked the jurisdiction to prosecute U.S. nationals for
crimes committed abroad, but also because the United States might lack the power to establish such
jurisdiction. Letter from Secretary of State Buchanan to Mr. Rush, American Minister to France (Sept.
25, 1847), in 1 MooRE, supra note 26, § 140, at 174 n.2.
61. See Act of Aug. 11, 1848, ch. 150, 9 Stat. 276 (1848), repealed as to Macao by Act of Sept. 20,
1850, 9 Stat. 468 (1860) (no longer in force, never codified).
62. See Act of June 22, 1860, ch. 179, 12 Stat. 72 (1860) (codified at REVISED STATUTES OF THE
UNITED STATES §§ 4083-4084 (2d ed. 1878)); H.R. Doc. No. 326, supra note 28, at 223.
63. See, e.g., Treaty of Peace, Amity, and Commerce, Dec. 31, 1845, U.S.-China, 6 Bevans 647;
Treaty with the Ottoman Porte, Feb. 2, 1831, U.S.-Ottoman Empire, 8 Stat. 408.
64. 15 CoNG. REc. 1617 (1884) (statement of Sen. Jones).
65. Id. at 1615 (statement of Sen. Ingalls).
66. The sentence was later commuted to life in prison. Id. at 1619 (statement of Sen. Pendleton).
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right to claim the protections of the Constitution when they traveled abroad,
particularly since the difficulty of finding suitable jurors and the "small amount
at stake" made it impractical to require the consul to summon a certain number
of jurors.67
C. Twentieth-Century Practice
For more than a century consular jurisdiction allowed the United States to
exercise jurisdiction over crimes committed abroad solely on the basis of the
offender's U.S. nationality. Consularjurisdiction comported with common law
ideals, since it ensured that U.S. nationals would be tried near the scene of
the crime, with witnesses and evidence readily available. But the practice of
stripping the host state ofjurisdiction over U.S. nationals violated the principle
of sovereignty, which holds that a state has the right to prosecute crimes within
its territory. 6" The United States gradually stopped using consular jurisdiction
in the first half of the twentieth century,69 yet like all forms of imperialism,
consular jurisdiction died slowly.70
The need to regulate the conduct of U.S. nationals abroad grew even
greater following World War II, however, when the United States permanently
stationed large numbers of troops, along with their civilian dependents, in
Europe and Asia. To address this and other needs, the United States negotiated
the NATO Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)7 and similar bilateral agreements with states hosting U.S. troops. These agreements provided U.S. courtsmartial with nationality-based jurisdiction over certain types of crimes committed in the host state by civilian dependents of U.S. military personnel."2
In a series of decisions in the 1950s and early 1960s, however, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that courts-martial could not constitutionally try civilian
dependents in peacetime because those courts did not provide trial by jury and
other procedures guaranteed to civilians under the Constitution.73 To prose67. Id. at 1617 (statements of Sen. Jones and Sen. Garland).
68. Compare The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362 (1824) (laws of one nation "can have no force
to control the sovereignty or rights of any other nation") and The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11
U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812) (Marshall, C.J.) (territorial jurisdiction is "necessarily exclusive and

absolute") with MOORE, supra note 19, at 35 (arguing that doctrine of sovereignty "of each nation over
all persons within its territory does not completely apply" in "barbarous lands").
69. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 2274, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1956) (reporting favorably on resolution
approving relinquishment of consular jurisdiction in Morocco and repealing its statutory foundation); H.R.
REP. No. 2697, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1956) (similar); Treaty for the Relinquishment of Extraterritorial
Rights in China and the Regulation of Related Matters, Jan. 11, 1943, U.S.-China, reprinted in S. EXEC.

REP. No. 2, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1943).
70. Cf., e.g., David J. Bederman, Extraterritorial Domicile and the Constitution, 28 VA. J. INT'L

L. 451 (1988) (arguing that consular jurisdiction lingered in Berlin until 1980s).
71. North Atlantic Treaty: Status of Forces, June 19, 1951, 4 U.S.T. 1792, 199 U.N.T.S. 67.

72. See, e.g., id. art. VI1(3); S. REP. No. 1268, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1955).
73. See Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960); Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S.
278 (1960); McElroy v. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
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cute civilian dependents, the United States would have to establish full-fledged
civilian courts in foreign countries, remodel courts-martial along civilian lines,
or establish nationality-based jurisdiction with venue in courts in the United
States. The U.S. government has not yet undertaken any of these options, and
thus a jurisdictional gap still exists.74
In other areas, Congress has occasionally accepted nationality-based
criminal jurisdiction, particularly in legislation implementing multilateral
conventions covering a narrow range of offenses. For example, the HostageTaking Act of 1984 applies specifically to terrorist-related hostage-taking
committed by or against U.S. nationals overseas.75 The Biological Weapons
Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989, which criminalizes the development, handling and
transfer of biological weapons, also applies to U.S. nationals outside the
United States.76 Finally, a bill to implement the Torture Convention would
criminalize torture committed overseas by U.S. nationals. 7
Congress has also expanded nationality-based jurisdiction in some areas
not covered by multilateral conventions. The "special maritime and territorial
jurisdiction of the United States" was recently amended to include crimes
committed by U.S. nationals "outside the jurisdiction of any nation. "78 In
addition, the statutes on tax evasion,79 perjury,' ° espionage,81 and operation
of gambling ships 2 apply to any U.S. national outside-the United States. 3
This patchwork of nationality-based jurisdiction applies to only a handful
of very specific crimes. It does not extend to violent crimes committed by U.S.
nationals overseas, and this in part explains why the United States has seldom
relied on nationality-based jurisdiction since the decline of consular jurisdiction."

74. See McClelland, supra note 5, at 179.
75. Hostage Taking Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 1203(b)(1)(A) (1988).
76. Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989, 18 U.S.C.A. § 175 (West Supp. 1991). A similar
statute applies to nuclear materials. See Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
Implementation Act of 1982, 18 U.S.C. § 8831 (1988).
77. See H.R. 3733, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 824 (1991), reprinted in 107 CoNG. REc. 1111,686,
1111,699 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991).
78. See Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1985, Pub. L. No.
98-473, tit. If,§ 1210, 98 Stat. 1837, 2164 (1984) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 7(7) (1988)).

79.
80.
81.
82.

See
See
See
See

26 U.S.C. § 7201 (1988) (tax evasion).
18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1988) (perjury).
18 U.S.C. §§ 793-794 (1988) (espionage).
18 U.S.C. § 1082(a) (1982) (gambling ships).

83. See Thurmond Amendment, discussed infra notes 118-120 and accompanying text.

84. One questionable exception, United States v. Erdos, 474 F.2d 157 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 876 (1973), is discussed below. See infra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
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D. Summary

The historical record reveals a number of explanations for U.S. reluctance
to embrace nationality-based criminal jurisdiction, even though it embraced
consular jurisdiction. From the eighteenth century to the early twentieth
century, the dominant objection was logistical, centering on access to witnesses
and evidence abroad. Consular jurisdiction, on the other hand, was not subject
to the evidentiary objection and flourished because the United States wanted
to protect its nationals from the vagaries of foreign law.
Other factors may also have inhibited nationality jurisdiction in courts
within the United States. Nationality-based jurisdiction ran counter to the
common law tradition of territorial jurisdiction. It implied lack of faith in
another sovereign's system of law. It subjected U.S. nationals to two sets of
laws while abroad. It ran the risk of offending foreign states. Finally, the
constitutional legitimacy of nationality-based jurisdiction was unclear. While
all of these objections also applied to consular jurisdiction, the characteristic
that distinguished consular jurisdiction from nationality-based jurisdiction,
emphasized by nineteenth century commentators, was the evidentiary concern.
In the nineteenth century, a U.S. consular court in China could try a U.S.
national who committed murder in Shanghai since the witnesses and evidence
were nearby. A court in San Francisco, however, could not have conducted
a fair trial as easily because the witnesses and evidence were half a world
away. In the late twentieth century consular jurisdiction has disappeared.
The United States now relies on a system of deference to foreign prosecutions-a system that works well when a foreign prosecution actually takes
place. The system does not work, however, when a foreign state fails to
prosecute the offender. Part II examines the current jurisdictional system in
more detail and considers whether a device other than nationality-based
criminal jurisdiction can remedy the systemic defects.
III. CLOSING

THE JURISDICTIONAL

GAP:

THE INADEQUATE ALTERNATIVES

TO NATIONALITY-BASED CRIMINAL JURISDICTION

A. ForeignProsecution
When a U.S. national commits a crime of violence abroad, the United
States normally relies on the state in which the crime occurred to prosecute
the offender. This is the most sensible approach to prosecuting crimes committed abroad by U.S. nationals if the host state is willing and able to prosecute,
because it ensures that the offender's trial takes place near the scene of the
crime (thus minimizing evidentiary problems), and avoids a conflict ofjurisdic-
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tion with the host state. In most cases, this approach works well because the
host state does indeed take jurisdiction.
A problem arises when the host state fails to prosecute. Even if the state
in which the crime occurred wants to prosecute, the U.S. offender may have
already returned to the United States, and U.S. law forbids extradition in the
absence of an extradition treaty.' The United States has no extradition treaty
with dozens of countries, including Korea, the Philippines, and Saudi Arabia.86 Moreover, even some existing U.S. treaties, such as the treaty with
Luxembourg, forbid extradition of U.S. nationals.8 7 Still other extradition
treaties do not apply to crimes outside the territory of the state requesting
extradition."8
Renegotiation of existing treaties to allow extradition of nationals, or
extradition for crimes committed outside the territory of the requesting state,
would be costly and unlikely to be accorded priority by the U.S. government.
In modern practice, negotiation of a treaty usually takes more than one round
of meetings and requires that three or four lawyers from the State and Justice
Departments travel to the negotiation site. If there is relatively little intercourse
between the United States and the country in question, negotiation of an
extradition treaty is not likely to be a priority. Even if the will exists to
negotiate a treaty, it may prove impossible to do so. For example, human
rights considerations may prevent ratification, 9 even if the extradition treaty
forbids extradition for a "political offense. "90 Additionally, the negotiating
states may disagree over the circumstances in which they should extradite

85. See 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1988). A proposal to abolish the treaty requirement is discussed infra notes
118-134 and accompanying text.

86. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES INFORCE 138, 193, 206 (1989).
87. See Treaty of Extradition, Oct. 29, 1883, U.S.-Lux., 23 Stat. 808; Supplementary Extradition
Convention, Mar. 3, 1936, U.S.-Lux., 49 Stat. 3355. The Luxembourg treaty, like many early U.S.

treaties, merely provided that neither party would be obliged to deliver up its nationals. The U.S. Supreme
Court has interpreted such provisions to forbid the extradition of U.S. nationals because they do not create

an affirmative obligation to extradite. See Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5 (1936).
88. See, e.g., Extradition: Jurisdiction, 6 Whiteman DIGEST at 889-99 (noting examples from U.S.
practice with Greece, Dominican Republic, Honduras, and Switzerland); Girard, supra note 40, at 508-09

(noting that some treaties speak of extradition for crimes committed within "jurisdiction" of requesting
state). Other treaties, however, permit extradition for crimes committed outside the territory of the requested
state, if the law of the requested state would permit prosecution in reverse circumstances. See, e.g.,
Extradition: Jurisdiction, supra, at 891 (citing U.S.-Belg. and Colom.-Pan. treaties).
89. The Senate scuttled a signed extradition treaty with the Philippines, for example, because of
concerns about human-rights violations by the Marcos regime. See Recent Actions Regarding Treaties to
Which the United States Isa Party, 21 I.L.M. 472, 474 (1982).
90. The political offense exception has been controversial in the United States since its successful.

invocation by Irish Republican Army members resisting extradition to the United Kingdom. See generally
Miriam E. Sapiro, Note, Extradition in an Era of Terrorism: The Need to Abolish the PoliticalOffense
Exception, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 654 (1986) (discussing history of political offense objection). In response,

the United States has over the past decade sought to narrow the scope of the political offense exception.
See, e.g., Supplementary Treaty of Extradition, June 25, 1985, U.S.-U.K., art. I, T.I.A.S. No. 8468.
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fugitives to face the death penalty, 9 the scope of the political offense exception,92 the obligation to extradite nationals, the offenses for which extradition
can be had, or the evidence sufficient to support extradition.93
Even closing the extradition gap would not entirely solve the problem of
offenders abroad who evade foreign prosecution for reasons unrelated to
extradition. The offender might possess diplomatic immunity, for example.
While the sending state has the option of waiving the immunity of its diplomat,
states rarely do so.94 Diplomatic immunity exists to eliminate any possibility
that a diplomat will face prosecution merely for political reasons.9" Any
waiver of immunity undermines that bright-line rule, encouraging the receiving
state to expect and demand waiver in more political cases. Presumably for this
reason the sending state is often reluctant to waive the immunity of its diplomats, and the receiving state must then resort to expulsion of the offending
individual.96 A sending state with nationality-based criminal jurisdiction may
prosecute its own diplomat,97 eliminating the possibility of a politically motivated foreign prosecution. A state that cannot exercise nationality jurisdiction,
such as the United States, faces an unappealing choice between waiver or
nonprosecution.
Even if the diplomat commits a crime in a U.S. embassy or consulate
overseas, the United States may not have jurisdiction to prosecute. Most
observers and commentators now agree that a diplomatic mission is no longer
considered a territorial enclave of the sending state, 9" and thus the United
91. See Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 4 (1989), reprintedin 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 439
(1989) (enjoining extradition until requesting state gave firm assurances that it would not seek death

penalty).
92. See Sapiro, supra note 90, at 655-56 (noting that states disagree over scope of political offense
exception to extradition).
93. See, e.g., National of Requested State, 6 Whiteman DIGEST § 18, at 865-84 (describing scope
of disagreement between states on extradition of nationals).
94. See Leslie S. Farhang, Note, Insuring Against Abuse of DiplomaticImmunity, 38 STAN. L. REV.

1517, 1526 (1986).
95. See Moira Griffin, DiplomaticImpunity, 13 STuDENT LAW. 18, 18-20 (Oct. 1984) (reporting U.S.
official's view that 60% of U.S. diplomats would refuse to serve in certain foreign countries without
diplomatic immunity).

96. See, e.g., EILEEN DENZA, DIPLOMATIC LAW 174-76 (1976) (describing British practice of
requesting waiver and, if necessary, of expelling offending diplomat); Waiver of Immunity, 7 Whiteman

DIGEST § 43, at 421-36 (describing State Department instructions to its personnel in Caracas not to waive
immunity).
97. See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, art. 31(4), 23 U.S.T. 3227, 3237,
500 U.N.T.S. 95.
98. See Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 729 F.2d 835, 841 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (criticizing rule
of sovereign immunity that would make U.S. embassies part of U.S. territory "'for jurisdictional purposes'"); BARRY CARTER & PHILLIP TRIMLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 622 (1991). But see Klinghoffer v.
Palestine Liberation Organization, 937 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1991) (repeating legal fiction that diplomatic

missions in United States are foreign territory).
The Klinghoffer court apparently misinterpreted article22(1) of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations, supra note 97, and its Optional Protocol on Disputes, June 29, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3374, 500

U.N.T.S. 241, which provides that the diplomatic mission is "inviolable" and thus cannot be intruded on
by the receiving state in the absence of consent or emergency. The Convention does not define a diplomatic

56
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States could not invoke the territorial principal of criminal jurisdiction to
prosecute the diplomat in question. In United States v. Erdos,9 9 however, the
Fourth Circuit held that the United States could exercise criminal jurisdiction
over a U.S. diplomat who killed another U.S. national on the premises of the
U.S. Embassy in Equatorial Guinea. Although one court has construed Erdos
as resting on the nationality principle of jurisdiction,"° the Erdos court itself
relied on the territorial principle by grounding its decision at least in part on
the notion that a U.S. embassy abroad is part of U.S. territory.' 0 ' Insofar
as this notion has been discredited, the precedential authority of Erdos is
questionable.
The host state may fail to prosecute even when it can gain custody of the
U.S. offender, if the conduct in question is not prosecutable under the host
state's laws. The host state may have a stricter standard of proof for crimes
such as rape, may impose an unduly light sentence for the offense, may be
barred from prosecuting by its own statute of limitations, or may not regard
certain conduct, such as child abduction or fraud, as criminal. The host state
may fail to prosecute for reasons based on the nationality of the parties involved, or on the cost of prosecution."0 2 For example, the host state may
have no interest in prosecuting a crime committed by one U.S. national against
another, particularly when a civilian dependent of a U.S. soldier stationed
overseas commits a crime against another U.S. national."ea Prosecution is
even less likely if the host state and United States have entered into a Status
of Forces Agreement envisioning that the United States will take jurisdiction
over some offenses committed by its civilian dependents stationed abroad.
Civilian dependents of U.S. soldiers commit thousands of crimes abroad
every year."' 4 A significant number of serious crimes go unprosecuted bemission as territory of the sending state.
99. 474 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 876 (1973).
100. See Persinger,729 F.2d at 842 n.11.
101. TheErdoscourtemphasizedthatthemurder occurred on the premises of a U.S. consular mission
abroad, and it asserted that a U.S. consular mission "'is a part of the territory of the United States of
America.'" 474 F.2d at 159 (quoting United States v. Archer, 51 F. Supp. 708, 709 (S.D. Cal. 1943)).
This assumption may have influenced the court's conclusion that a diplomatic or consular mission is part
of the "special maritime or territorial jurisdiction" of the United States, which includes "landi reserved
or acquired for the use of the United States" under 18 U.S.C. § 7 (1988). 474 F.2d at 159-60.
The Justice Department has taken the position that Erdosshould not be extended to U.S. military bases
overseas, noting that such an interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 7 would "likely incur serious international
repercussions." Letter from Ass't Att'y Gen. Kevin D. Rooney to Mr. Allen R. Voss, Director, General
Government Division, U.S. GAO, in GAO Report, supra note 5, at 49.
102. See DRAPER, supranote 5, at 140-41; Hearingon Law Enforcement,supranote 5, at 8 (statement
of Rep. Rangel).
103. See, e.g., 1965 SOFA Hearing,supra note 9 (statement of Gen. Hodson) (citing British reluctance
to prosecute U.S. civilian who committed crime on Ascension Island, on grounds that it was matter
"between United States personnel").
104. See, e.g., Office of the Judge Advocate Gen., Dep't of Defense, Statistics on the Exercise of
Criminal Jurisdiction by Foreign Tribunals over United States Personnel, 1 December 1987-30 November
1988 (unpublished, on file with author).
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cause the host state does not prosecute, and because the United States cannot
constitutionally try civilians in courts-martial as they do not conform to
constitutional standards, such as providing trial by jury. 5 According to the
Pentagon, for example, some of the U.S. servicemen involved in the My Lai
massacre (including several who admitted complicity in the incident) escaped
prosecution because they left the military before charges were brought, and
thus evaded the jurisdiction of the courts-martial."es
One possible solution to this dilemma would involve reforming military
tribunals to permit the prosecution of civilians." ° The U.S. Supreme Court
has expressed skepticism, however, asserting that military tribunals "probably
never can be constituted in such a way that they can have the same kind of
qualifications that the Constitution has deemed essential to fair trials of civilians in federal courts." 108 Most commentators share this view, noting that
a reform of military tribunals would probably require the establishment of
civilian courts abroad, complete with civilian judges protected by life tenure
and a guaranteed salary, civilian jurors paid for their time, and perhaps a more
comprehensive public defender system than currently available. 9 These new
civilian institutions would operate alongside existing military tribunals because
the military is unlikely to abandon traditional courts-martial, which are based

105. Id. at 14-15; see also cases cited supra note 73.
106. See FxtraterritorialCriminal Jurisdiction:Hearing Before the Subcoran. on Immigration,
Citizenship and IntemationalLaw of the House Judiciary Comm., 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 49-50 (1989)
[hereinafterHearing on CriminalJurisdiction](statement of Benjamin Forman, Assistant General Counsel,
Department of Defense). Commentators have argued that the United States currently has the authority to
prosecute ex-soldiers in federal district court for violations of the law of war. See Jordan J. Paust, After
My Lal: The Casefor War Crime Jurisdictionover Civiliansin FederalDistrictCourts, 50 TEX. L. REV.
6, 33-34 (1971). Efforts to "bring internationally recognized human rights into our domestic legal process
as treaty law" have been unsuccessful, since courts typically find that treaty obligations are not self-executing. See Jordan J. Paust, Human Rights and the NinthAmendment: A New Form of Guarantee,60 CoRNELL
L. REV. 231, 233 & nn.9-10 (1975).
107. See DRAPER, supra note 5, at 48. One commentator suggested circumventing this problem by
amending the Constitution to allow courts-martial to exercise jurisdiction over civilian dependents, or by
persuading civilian dependents to waive constitutional rights, such as the right to trial by jury, as a
precondition to employment or sponsorship by the military overseas. See McClelland, supranote 5, at 19598; see also Everett 0. Robinson & Laurent R. Hourcle, Crime Without Punishment-Ex-Servicemen,
Civilian Employees andDependents, 13 JAG L. REv. 184, 197 (1971) (discussing waiver of constitutional
guarantees).
108. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955).
109. See McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960) (denouncing overseas
courts as "new extraterritoriality"); Petitioners' Brief at 95-98, McElroy (No. 59-21); George, supra note
14, at 620 (arguing this is one area in which "clear recognition of the nationality principle as a basis for
criminal legislation is needed"); McClelland, supra note 5, at 202-05. But cf.Girard, supra note 40, at
511-19 (arguing for civilian-style courts abroad, complete with federally-funded public defenders).
Since the decline of consular jurisdiction, the United States has not found it expedient to establish
civilian courts abroad. One recent endeavor, the U.S. Court for Berlin, closed operations after entertaining
precisely one case. See United States v. Tiede, 86 F.R.D. 227 (U.S. Ct. Berlin 1979); Letter from U.S.
Ambassador Stoessel to Herbert J. Stem (May 29, 1979), in HERBERT J. STERN, JUDGMENT IN BERLN
374 (1984).
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on the belief that military personnel should judge each other for violations of
military rules. 110

For these reasons, the Department of Defense and Congress have focused
on establishing nationality-based criminal jurisdiction in courts in the United
States, rather than on reforming courts-martial to provide the requisite procedural guarantees. In the late 1960s and 1970s, the Department of Defense
urged Congress to establish nationality-based criminal jurisdiction over crimes
committed by civilian dependents, with venue to lie in federal courts within
the United States."' Congress has yet to establish such jurisdiction, much
to the dismay of military prosecutors.112 A Senate subcommittee chaired by
Senator Ervin held hearings on the matter for a number of years.' Senator

Ervin introduced two bills to establish nationality jurisdiction over civilian
dependents,"

4

although he had doubts that the bills conformed with the U.S.

Constitution or with the common law tradition of territoriality." 5 If reform
of courts-martial is unrealistic, and if some civilian dependents continue to
escape prosecution by host states, the United States has only two alternatives:
either to exercise nationality-based jurisdiction over civilian dependents, or to
forego prosecution altogether." 6

The conclusion seems inescapable: some U.S. nationals who commit
serious crimes on a foreign state's soil will go unprosecuted by the foreign
government. Extradition problems will stand in the way of some prosecutions,
110. "It is true that military personnel because of their training and experience may be especially
competent to try soldiers for infractions of military rules. Such training is no doubt particularly important
where an offense charged against a soldier is purely military. . . ." Toth, 350 U.S. at 18.
111. Interestingly, theDepartmentofJusticeappearedreluctantto endorse the DepartmentofDefense's
proposal for a longer prosecutorial arm, apparently out of concern that these cases would unduly burden
federal prosecutors with garden-variety crimes. See Hearing on CriminalJurisdiction,supra note 106, at
52 (statement of BenjaminForman, Assistant General Counsel, Department of Defense). See also Operation
of Article VIi, NATO Status of Forces Treaty: Hearingbefore a Subcomm. of the Senate Armed Services
Comm., 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1969) [hereinafter 1969 SOFA Hearing](statement of Benjamin Forman)
(noting failure of Department of Defense to secure approval for legislation to establish jurisdiction over
civilian dependents overseas); 1965 SOFA Hearing, supra note 9, at 14 (statement of Benjamin Forman)
(relating "difficulty in getting a consensus within the Pentagon and within the Government" on jurisdiction
over civilian dependents). However, many of the crimes in question are serious crimes. See supra note
5 (citing statistics).
112. See McClelland, supranote 5, at 212-13.
113. See, e.g., OperationofArticle VII, NATO Status of ForcesTreaty:Hearing before a Subcomm.
of the Senate Armed Services Comm., 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) [hereinafter 192 SOFA Hearing];1970
SOFA Hearing, supra note 5; 1969 SOFA Hearing, supra note 111; 1965 SOFA Hearing, supra note 9.
The House has held fewer hearings on nationality jurisdiction, and has focused those hearings on
civilian dependents of military personnel overseas as well as jurisdiction in Antarctica. See, e.g., Hearing
on CriminalJurisdiction,supra note 106.
114. See S. 3188, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); S. 3189, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
115. "There are some serious constitutional questions involved as to whether we can assume jurisdiction of civilians even though they are Americans in a foreign country. It is a notion I think that is rather
hostile to the common law system." 1965 SOFA Hearing, supra note 9, at 15 (statement of Sen. Ervin).
116. For a general discussion on the prosecution of military personnel and civilian dependents, see
RONALD J. STANGER, CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OVER VISITING ARMED FORCES (Naval War College
International Law Studies 1957-1958, 1965).
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while diplomatic immunity will block others. In many cases, the foreign state's
own law may bar proseciution, or it may not wish to incur the expense of
prosecuting one foreigner for a crime committed against another foreigner.
B. Alternative Basesfor U.S. Jurisdiction
Given that foreign states will not always prosecute U.S. offenders abroad,
the next question is whether the United States can undertake such a prosecution
on a jurisdictional basis other than the nationality principle. International law
recognizes four alternatives to nationality-based criminal jurisdiction: the
territorial effects principle, the protective principle, the universal principle,
and the passive personality principle. Three of the alternatives do not apply
to crimes of violence committed by a U.S. national on foreign soil. The
territorial-effects principle applies to crimes committed in foreign states that
have a discernible effect on U.S. territory. The importation of narcotics or
other contraband is the paradigmatic example. The protective principle applies
to crimes committed against the United States itself, such as treason or espionage; it does not apply to crimes committed against private parties. The
universal principle applies to genocide, war crimes, and other offenses so
universally repugnant that every state has jurisdiction over them.
The final basis, the passive personality principle, grounds jurisdiction on
the nationality of the victim. It thus could allow prosecution of crimes committed against U.S. nationals abroad. This basis of jurisdiction, however, does
not provide jurisdiction over crimes committed by U.S. nationals in foreign
states against nationals of a third country. It could be argued that the United
States has no valid policy interest in prosecuting crimes committed by U.S.
nationals against foreigners abroad. But surely such an interest exists if the
host state or the victim's state of nationality either requests a U.S. prosecution,
or acquiesces to one. Although the passive personality remedy is incomplete,
Congress seems quite taken with this alternative. Reacting to the alleged
murder of one U.S. national by another in Korea," 7 the U.S. Senate adopted
a provision known as the Thurmond Amendment in 1991. The bill would
establish jurisdiction over cases involving the murder of U.S. nationals on
foreign soil, regardless of the nationality of the offender, provided that a senior
Justice Department official certifies that no prosecution "has been previously
undertaken by a foreign country for the same act or omission," and that the

117. See 137 CoNG. REC. S4750-51 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 1991) (statement of Sen. Thurmond)
(introducing passive personality bill and arguing that it would help address cases such as murder of Carolyn
Abel in Korea); id. at S4751-52 (statement of Sen. Hollings) (supporting bill for similar reasons).
118. H.R. 3371, 102d Cong., 1stSess. § 110(a) (1991), reprintedin 137 CONG. REC. H11,686 (daily
ed. Nov. 26, 1991). The bill passed both houses of Congress, and the House adopted a conference report
on the bill, but the bill stalled in late November when the Senate voted not to close debate.
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Attorney General, in consultation with the Secretary of State, determines that
the conduct "took place in a country in which the person is no longer present,9
and the country lacks the ability to lawfully secure the person's return. ""
The bill would also remove the longstanding statutory bar to extradition from
if the offense in question involves
the United States in the absence of treaty,
120
a violent crime against a U.S. national.
The Thurmond Amendment misfires in several directions. It errs first by
adopting the most controversial form of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction-the passive personality principle.121 This principle is controversial
because it focuses criminal responsibility not on the conduct of the offender,
but on the status of the victim, a variable irrelevant to universal deterrence.
As the U.S. Department of State said more than one hundred years ago, a
foreign state establishing passive personality jurisdiction would subject all U.S.
nationals
not merely to a dual, but to an indefinite responsibility .... It would expose
citizens and all other persons in the United States to liability to as many penal
systems as there happened to be nationalities represented in the foreign population.
Every fresh accession to that population would extend the operation, and potentially
1
increase the variety, of foreign penal systems in force in this country. "

The most extreme example would be a state that imposed the death penalty
for any crime committed against one of its nationals. This problem could be
ameliorated by restricting passive personality jurisdiction to those serious
crimes that carry similar punishments everywhere. The Thurmond Amendment
itself is limited to murder. Nonetheless, while everyone knows that murder is
a serious crime, regardless of the identity of the victim, it may be less fair to
presume that foreigners know how seriously the United States punishes lesser
crimes. Moreover, because of the U.S. reputation for aggressively exercising
extraterritorial jurisdiction, foreign states may view any U.S. attempts to
exercise passive personality jurisdiction with suspicion.
Another problem with passive personality jurisdiction is that third-party
states might be reluctant to extradite to the United States, particularly if there
are competing extradition requests. Modern extradition treaties typically give

119. S.1241, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 3201-3203 (1990), reprintedin 137 CoNG. REc. S10,018-19
(daily ed. July 15, 1991) (Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1991).
120. See id. § 3203.
121. See, e.g., RESTATE MENT, supra note 3, § 402 cmt. g (noting that passive personality principle
"has not been generally accepted for ordinary torts or crimes"); BRoWNLIE, supra note 11, at 303
(describing passive personality as "least justifiable" basis of jurisdiction).
122. MOORE, supra note 19, at 101. The State Department remains committed to this view. See 137
CONG. REc. S4750, S4752 (1991) (statement of Sen. Hollings) (reprinting letter from Assistant Secretary
of State Janet G. Mullins to Sen. Hollings (Dec. 26, 1989)) [hereinafter Mullins's Letter to Hollings]. See
also Edward R. Harris, Note, Reaching the ExtraterritorialCriminal Offender. Jurisdictionto Prescribe
and Enforce UnitedStates LawExtraterritoriallyUnderSection204 of the ProposedFederalCriminalCode,
1 B.U. INT'L L.J. 207, 213 (1982) (arguing that offender can "reasonably foresee" punishment for violating
law of state in which crime occurred, but not that of victim's home state).
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the requested state discretion to choose between requesting states. While some
treaties list the place of commission of the offense and the nationality of the
offender as relevant factors, they generally do not mention the nationality of
the victim. 1" Thus other states might frustrate U.S. reliance on passive personality jurisdiction by refusing to accept it as a legitimate basis ofjurisdiction.
A further problem with the Thurmond Amendment is that it repeals the
statutory bar to extradition in the absence of a treaty, 24 provided that the
fugitive is sought for a nonpolitical crime of violence against a U.S. national.
In so doing the Amendment deprives fugitives, including U.S. fugitives, of all
the important safeguards contained in extradition treaties, including the rule
of specialty (limiting prosecution to the crimes for which the fugitive was
extradited), the principle of non bis in idem (the treaty analogue of double
jeopardy), the requirement that extradition be limited principally to felonies,
and the principle that extradition may be barred by a statute of limitations." 5
In addition, elimination of the treaty requirement would diminish the Senate's
constitutional role in deciding which states should have extradition relations
with the United States. Furthermore, facilitating extradition would not guarantee prosecution in all cases because the host state often cannot or will not
prosecute even if the accused is returned to the host state.
Finally, the Thurmond Amendment repeats the mistake made in the socalled Specter Bill on Terrorism, in which the Congress provided that subjectmatter jurisdiction would turn on an unreviewable decision by the Attorney
General that the conduct at issue was related to a terrorist incident.1 26 The
Thurmond Amendment provides for jurisdiction if the Attorney General makes
an unreviewable determination that the fugitive is not in the host state and that
the host state "lacks the ability to lawfully secure the person's return."127
Such provisions have been justly criticized as providing the executive with a
say insubject-matter jurisdiction, a matter that must ultimately be determined
by the judiciary. 2 A better approach would require the executive to make
some showing that the foreign state could not prosecute, and to allow the court
to find whether the facts presented justify a finding of jurisdiction.

123. E.g., Treaty of Extradition, May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mex., art. I(2)(a), 31 U.S.T. 5059; Treaty of
Extradition, June 20, 1978, U.S.-F.R.G., art. XVII(1), 32 U.S.T. 1485; Treaty of Extradition, Jan. 12,
1970, U.S.-N.Z., art. XIV, 22 U.S.T. 1.
124. United States law currently permits extradition only pursuant to treaty or convention. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3184 (1988). As a constitutional matter, the executive may extradite U.S. nationals only if authorized
by treaty or statute. See Valentine v. United States e rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 8-9 (1936).
125. See, e.g., Treaty of Extradition, Oct. 21, 1976, U.S.-U.K., art. III(1)(c), 28 U.S.T. 227
[hereinafter U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty] (felony requirement); id. art. V (non bis in idem); id. art.

V(1)(b) (statute of limitations); id. art. XII (specialty).
126. See Antiterrorism Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2331 (West Supp. 1991).
127. H.R. 3371, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 110(a) (1991), reprintedin 137 CONG. REc. H11,686 (daily

ed. Nov. 26, 1991).
128. See Lowenfeld, supra note 15, at 891-92.
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Whatever the merits of passive personality jurisdiction, its controversial
nature argues for caution. Although some states have experimented with
passive personality jurisdiction,'29 and although it enjoys some legitimacy
as a basis for prosecution of terrorists, 3 ' it is still not a generally accepted
basis for exercising jurisdiction over common crimes.13 1 Other, less controversial, bases of jurisdiction are available that avoid the problems inherent in
the Thurmond Amendment. In particular, nationality-based criminal jurisdiction
is a much less controversial basis that would have easily addressed the facts
of the Korean case, as well as the facts of United States v. Erdos.'32 The
State Department, which criticized the Thurmond Amendment, has said it
would support a bill founded on the nationality principle. 33 Unfortunately,
Congress seems oblivious to the difference between nationality and passive
personality jurisdiction and has incorporated passive personality jurisdiction
into those few recent instances in which it has adopted nationality-based
jurisdiction.

134

In light of the lack of feasible alternatives to nationality-based jurisdiction,

Part IV considers whether the application of this principle to crimes committed
abroad would be consistent with the U.S. Constitution and with international
law.
IV. LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR NATIONALITY-BASED CRIMINAL JURISDICTION

A. ConstitutionalLaw
The unenumerated foreign affairs power is the most appropriate basis for
congressional regulation of U.S. nationals abroad.' 35 Congress has "power
S. 1241, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); supra notes 118-122 and accompanying text;
129. See, e.g.,
Criminal Jurisdiction, 6 Whiteman DIGEST § 5, at 103-05 (describing examples from Mexican practice).
130. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 402 reporters' note 3. Even the problem of terrorism may
not require the use of passive personality jurisdiction because terrorist crimes implicate the more widely
accepted protective principle. See Christopher L. Blakesley, Jurisdiction as Legal Protection Against
Terrorism, 19 CONN. L. REV. 895, 941-42 (1987).
131. See RESTATEMENT, supranote 3, § 402 cmt. g.
132. 474 F.2d 157 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 876 (1973); see supra notes 99-101 and
accompanying text.
133. See Letter from Janet G. Mullins, Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs, to Richard
Darman, Chairman of the Office of Management and Budget 2 (July 29, 1991) [hereinafter Mullins's Letter
to Darman]. Ms. Mullins's letter apparently refers to the murder of Carolyn Abel in Korea in December,
1988. See also OregonianReturnsHome, supra note 8. The Department expressed a similar view a century
ago. 'A state may, if it see fit, tie its criminal law about the neck of its citizen and hold him answerable
for its violation everywhere." MOORE, supra note 19, at 125.
134. See, e.g., Hostage-Taking Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (1988) (providing forjurisdictionover offenses
committed by or against U.S. nationals); 18 U.S.C. § 7(7) (1988) (establishing extraterritorial jurisdiction
in cases "outside the jurisdiction of any nation with respect to an offense by or against a national of the
United States').
135. Professor Lowenfeld believes that jurisdiction based solely on the nationality of the offender is
"questionable under the Constitution without some additional link to the United States." See Lowenfeld,
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to deal with foreign affairs,"' 36 and appears to have used this power to enact
a wide variety of laws touching on foreign affairs, including nationality-based
statutes, while declining to explain their constitutional basis. 37 The courts
have repeatedly upheld such laws, although they have generally failed to
explain which congressional power applies.' The Supreme Court itself has

hinted that the United States could establish nationality-based criminaljurisdiction over civilian dependents of military personnel overseas, and that venue
could lie within the United States.' 39
This reliance on the foreign affairs power is well-justified. The foreign
affairs power confers on the national government all the powers to regulate
foreign policy that inhere in national sovereignty. ° The State Department
has taken the same position, arguing that the exercise of nationality jurisdiction
is an attribute of sovereignty, and that the enumeration of powers in Article
I of the U.S. Constitution was not intended to diminish the powers inherent
in sovereignty.'

41

The practice of the Framers of the Constitution, many of whom also
participated in the young Republic's government, supports the conclusion that

supra note 15, at 881-82, 886-92.
A number of other observers argue that Congress does have this authority, but they disagree on its
source, suggesting alternatives such as the unenumerated "foreign affairs power," the power to regulate
foreign commerce, the power to define and punish certain offenses, and the power to implement treaties.
See, e.g., H.R. Doc. No. 326, supra note 28, at 204 (citing treaty-making power, foreign commerce
power, and international affairs power); HENKN, supra note 24, at 75-76 (citing foreign affairs power);
George, supra note 14, at 615-16 (citing wide variety of congressional powers); Girard, supra note 40,
at 41 (citing foreign commerce power and others); McClelland, supra note 5, at 67 (citing foreign affairs
and foreign commerce powers).
136. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 59 (1958).
137. See HENKIN, supra note 24, at 74-76 (arguing that Congress has relied on foreign affairs power
to enact statutes regarding foreign diplomatic activity and immigration laws, to adopt nationality-based
extraterritorial jurisdiction over both civil and criminal matters, and to justify act of state doctrine).
138. See, e.g., Blackmerv. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932); United States v. Black, 291 F. Supp.
262, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) ('[Tihe power of Congress to enact statutes in the national interest extending
to all its citizens-even those upon the high seas-cannot be doubted.') (citing cases); United States v.
Baker, 136 F. Supp. 546, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) ('An American citizen is subject to the laws of the United
States wherever he may be.") (dictum).
139. See Kinsella v. United States, 361 U.S. 234, 246 (1960); see also Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S.
11, 21 (1955) (Constitution allows Congress to establish jurisdiction over discharged soldiers). The power
to regulate the armed forces might also support jurisdiction over civilian dependents, but it obviously has
no application to other U.S. offenders abroad.
140. See Blackmer, 284 U.S. at 437 ('Nor can it be doubted that the United States possesses the power
inherentin sovereignty to require the return to this country of a citizen, resident elsewhere, whenever the
public interest requires it, and to penalize him in case of refusal.') (emphasis added); see also HENKIN,
supranote 24, at 74.
141. Although the Justice Department has suggested that the constitutional issue has been settled, the
Department did not specify which power of Congress supports the establishment of this jurisdiction. See
Hearingon CriminalJurisdiction,supra note 106, at 31 (statement of Robert L. Keuch, Deputy Assistant
Attorney General, Department of Justice) (asserting that "liltis settled that there is no constitutional impediment" to establishment of nationality-based criminal jurisdiction). The Department of Defense has reached
the same conclusion, again without specifying which power of Congress it has in mind. See 1970 SOFA
Hearing,supra note 5, at 6.
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the foreign affairs power includes the power to criminalize the conduct of U.S.
nationals abroad solely on the basis of their U.S. nationality. As discussed in
Part III, the first Congresses made U.S. citizenship an indispensable element
of a host of crimes, including treason, piracy, communicating with foreign
governments, engaging in the slave trade, and committing any sort of crime
while accompanying armed forces in the field. 42 Even if each of these early
statutes can individually be explained as the enactment of some other form of
extraterritorial jurisdiction, such as the protective principle, they each contain
an element of the nationality principle. In addition, the early Republic's
flirtation with and eventual embrace of consular jurisdiction in the nineteenth
century suggests that U.S. nationals acquiesced in the extension U.S. laws
while abroad, especially if the alternative was obedience to foreign law.
This historical reliance on the foreign affairs power continues to make
sense in that the nationality principle can play an important role in the regulation of U.S. foreign affairs. Although diplomatic relations rarely stand or fall
on the disposition of any one criminal case, the criminal acts of U.S. nationals
abroad can strain international relations. 43 In such cases, the foreign affairs
power would be the most appropriate basis for nationality-based criminal
jurisdiction. Arguably, the power might extend to any crime of any magnitude
committed by a U.S. national abroad. Even the most petty thief can damage
the reputation of the United States.
Another possible source of authority for nationality-based jurisdiction is
the Foreign Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.'" A number of
commentators have asserted that the authority for regulating the activities of
U.S. nationals abroad comes from this power. 45 If interstate commerce
jurisprudence is any guide, the Foreign Commerce Clause may supply a
constitutional basis for regulation in at least some cases. United States courts
have interpreted the Interstate Commerce Clause very broadly to authorize
regulation of all activity that has an interstate effect, making it the "chief
source of congressional regulatory power."" The Foreign Commerce
Clause, though not often addressed by the Supreme Court, has been accorded

142. Professor Girard warns against excessive reliance on evidence that the early U.S. army exercised
criminal jurisdiction over civilian employees and dependents in the field. He argues that such jurisdiction
was rarely exercised, generally only in time of war, and bore little relation to the exercise of criminal

jurisdiction over civilian dependents of today's military services. See Girard, supra note 40, at 482-88.
143. See infra note 163 and accompanying text.
144. "The Congress shall have Power [to] regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian Tribes .... " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.-3.
145. DRAPER, supra note 5,at 144 (trial of civilian dependents of military personnel may bejustified
under either foreign commerce power or power to regulate armies); McClelland, supra note 5, at 198
("Congress derives the power to legislate extraterritorial jurisdiction over citizens as an incident of its power
to regulate foreign relations and commerce.").
146. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTiTmtIONAL LAW § 5-4, at 305-06 (2d ed. 1988) (citing
Lord v. Steamship Co., 102 U.S. 541, 544 (1881)).
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a broad scope similar to that of the Interstate Commerce Clause. 47 While
the commerce power "might be sufficient to support virtually any legislation
' the foreign
that relates to foreign intercourse, i.e., to foreign relations," 48
commerce power is generally thought to be no broader than the interstate com149
merce power.
Congress could attempt to regulate crimes committed by U.S. nationals
abroad on the theory that their travel outside the United States is foreign
intercourse. The foreign commerce power might, for example, extend to the
actions of a U.S. national who traveled to a foreign country with the express
purpose of kidnapping someone there, just as kidnapping across state lines
triggers federal jurisdiction in the domestic sphere. But this theory loses force
if the travel is unrelated to the crime. Alternatively, Congress could regulate
crimes committed by U.S. nationals abroad on the theory that any transaction
by a U.S. national overseas is a form of foreign commerce. This "personality
theory" of the Foreign Commerce Clause would arguably expand its scope
beyond that of the Interstate Commerce Clause. Still, even assuming that a
broad interpretation of the Foreign Commerce Clause would support nationality-based criminal jurisdiction, a less tenuous alternative basis is preferable.
One final candidate is the congressional power to "define and punish
Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the
Law of Nations.""' This power, however, rarely encompasses nationalitybased jurisdiction over crimes committed on foreign soil because very few
crimes constitute "Offences against the Law of Nations." Indeed, it is difficult
to see how any one individual can commit an offense against the "Law of
Nations," since international law normally applies only to states.'' Still, the
Congress and the Supreme Court have apparently interpreted the Offences
Clause broadly, and have invoked it, along with the power to implement
treaties, to justify the establishment of nationality-based jurisdiction over
crimes like genocide, terrorist-related hostage-taking, torture, and aircraft
sabotage."52 For other crimes, the power to implement treaties is unavailable
because no treaty or principle of international law currently requires a state
to establish nationality-based jurisdiction over its nationals for crimes such as

147. See HENKIN, supra note 24, at 70 n.9.
148. Id. at 70.
149. It has been argued that the Foreign Commerce Clause should be interpreted more broadly, since
the interstate commerce power came at the "expense of the reserved powers of the States" while the foreign
commerce power derived from the federal government's unshared power over foreign relations. That view,

however, has generally been abandoned. Id. at 70 n.9.
150. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
151. See HENK N, supra note 24, at 72-73.
152. See id. at 73-74 (quoting United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479, 487-88 (1887)). Such imple-

menting legislation could, of course, be justified under other sources of congressional authority, such as
the power to implement treaties or the foreign affairs power. See Id. at 73.
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murder or rape, which are not considered "Offences against the Law of Nations."
The U.S. Congress therefore possesses constitutionality authority to
regulate the conduct of U.S. nationals overseas. The unenumerated foreign
affairs power is the most plausible source of this authority. The question
remains whether international law can place any limits on the foreign affairs
power.
B. InternationalLaw and Practice
It is unclear whether the limits of the foreign affairs power, or any other
federal power relating to international relations, can be defined by reference
to international law."' United States courts have repeatedly held that the
Constitution permits the federal government to enact and enforce legislation
that is inconsistent with international law.154 Nevertheless, international law
may limit jurisdiction, particularly when Congress acts to define an offense
against the law of nations, or when it exercises powers of sovereignty derived
from international law, such as the foreign affairs power. 5
Although international law may limit jurisdiction, it is beyond dispute that
the United States may exercise criminal jurisdiction over U.S. nationals abroad
in at least some circumstances.156 The notion that a state may exercise nationality-based criminal jurisdiction over an individual is uncontroversial.' 57
Many civil law states, as well as some common law states, exercise jurisdiction
in this fashion. 5 ' Nevertheless, there are limits to the nationality principle.
Indeed, the United States has been criticized for stretching the nationality
principle to apply civil laws in the face of conflicting foreign laws, or to
foreign-incorporated subsidiaries of U.S. corporations that are not easily
categorized as "nationals.""'9

153. "No one knows the reaches of the foreign affairs power of Congress." id. at 76. International
law, of course, recognizes only the five principles ofjurisdiction outlined above. See supra text accompanying notes 11-14.

154. See, e.g., United States v. PalestineLiberation Organization, 695 F. Supp. 1456, 1564 (S.D.N.Y.
1988) (noting that Act of Congress may supersede treaty obligation if such purpose is expressly stated in

Act).
155. See Lowenfeld, supra note 15, at 881-82.
156. See RESTATEMENT, supranote 3, § 404.
157. See generally HARVARD RESEARCH, supranote 14, at 435 (comments on Draft Convention on
Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime).
158. See National of Requested State, 6 Whiteman DIGEST § 18, at 876-78.
159. See, e.g., John Kennedy, Rich Papers'Availabilityis Under Debate, WASH. POST, Sept. 21,
1983, at F1 (reporting that Switzerland complained of U.S. efforts "to apply its laws in Switzerland);

Tamar Levin, Business and the Law: UnitedStates vs. Bank of Nova Scotia, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1983,
at D2 (quoting Canadian official criticizing U.S. efforts to enforce subpoenas extraterritorially as showing

"profound lack of respect for Canadian sovereignty and for the rules of international law"); cf. LoWE, supra
note 4, at xv (1983) (noting that United States "is much the most prominent of the claimants to extraterritorial jurisdiction").
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In civil law and common law systems alike, nationality jurisdiction is
normally justified by the theory that the national owes allegiance to the home
state both while at home and while abroad."e° According to this view, the
state provides its national the benefits of nationality, including protection at
home and abroad, in exchange for the national's obedience.' 6' The reciprocal
obligations may be fewer abroad, but they still exist. For example, the U.S.
government provides diplomatic protection in the form of consular services to
its nationals in distress,' 62 while the U.S. national remains subject to important U.S. criminal laws, such as treason.
The allegiance theory does not entirely explain why a state should have an
interest in regulating the behavior of its nationals while they are abroad,
especially if their conduct does not directly harm the security or territory of
the home state. This interest is justified by two concerns. First, the home state
has an interest in deterring its nationals from engaging in conduct that damages
that state's reputation and foreign relations. Second, the international community as a whole has an interest in deterring serious crimes that currently go
unpunished because no state exercises jurisdiction.
The first justification rests on the possibility that the crimes a national
commits abroad will be associated with the home state itself. Crimes committed abroad by a state's nationals can significantly strain the home state's
relations with other states, particularly if other states expect the home state to
prosecute and the home state lacks jurisdiction to do so. If, for example, a
160. See, e.g., Blackmerv. United States, 284 U.S. 421,427 (1932) (referring to "duties of the citizen
in relation to his own government"); United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 102 (1922) (nationality
jurisdiction justified on grounds of defendant's "allegiance'); United States v. King, 552 F.2d 833, 851
(9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 966 (1977) ('American authority over [U.S. nationals abroad] could
be based upon the allegiance they owe this country and its laws . . . ."); Chase, supra note 1, at 557;
HARVARD RESEARCH, supra note 14, at 519; Everett P. Wheeler, The Relation of the Citizen Domiciled
in a Foreign Country to His Home Government, 3 AM. J. INT'L L. 869, 874 (1909) (asserting that national
'must do nothing with his native allegiance or be found in hostility to his native country') (citations
omitted). But see BORCHARD, supranote 30, § 5, at 9-10 (arguing that national's "allegiance" grows out
of relationship resembling adoption more than contract); EDWARD S. STImSON, CONFLICT OF CRIMINAL
LAWS 1-2 (1936) ('The government has no interest in the conduct of its citizens abroad except when that
conduct results in injury to it, because the peace and good order of its territory is not disturbed.') (citing
People v. Tyler, 7 Mich. 161, 221 (1859)); WESTLAKE, supra note 18, at 253 (arguing that exercise of
nationality-based jurisdiction is "intervention on behalf of morality').
161. In antiquity, the consideration for the social contract-a citizen's obedience to Roman law while
abroad-was a price worth paying since it was a privilege to be governed by Roman law, which the Romans
considered superior to the law of the barbarians. See BORCHARD, supra note 30, at 4-5; Kassan, supra note
27, at 240.
162. It is the longstanding policy of the United States to send diplomatic or consular representatives
to watch foreign criminal proceedings involving U.S. nationals. Diplomatic protests over assertedly unfair
trials are occasionally successful. See Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 249 (codified at REVISED STATUTES OF
THE UNITED STATES § 2001 (2d ed. 1878)) (requiring President to demand release of U.S. nationals
wrongfully held abroad), reprinted in NATIONAUTY LAWS 578-79 (Richard W. Fluornoy & Manley 0.
Hudson eds., 1929); BoRCHARD, supranote 30, at 98-102 (citing examples from U.S. diplomatic practice).
In 1961, the international community codified this practice in the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations,
Apr. 18, 1961, art. 36(c), 23 U.S.T. 3227, which guarantees states consular access to their nationals in
custody abroad.
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U.S. national committed a series of murders in the Philippines and then
returned to the United States, the Philippines would probably request that the
fugitive be extradited or prosecuted. If extradition were not possible-which
is likely given the absence of a U.S.-Philippine extradition treaty-and if the
United States did not prosecute for lack of jurisdiction, then relations between
the United States and the Philippines would be strained. 63 In such a case,
the United States would have a valid interest in exercising jurisdiction to
preserve good relations with the Philippines and to deter similar conduct by
U.S. nationals in the future. 164
The second justification rests on the conviction that the international
community has a collective interest in deterring crime. Consequently, the
international community has an interest in ensuring that serious offenders do
not escape prosecution when the host state wishes to prosecute but cannot do
so. The international community can further this interest by establishing a
reliable alternative to host-state jurisdiction, such as nationality-based criminal
jurisdiction, to be exercised in the event that the host state does not prosecute.
Nationality jurisdiction is universally accepted as a basis for extraterritorial
jurisdiction. 6 5 As a political matter, some foreign states might resent any
expansion of U.S. jurisdiction. While conceding that the United States has
concurrent jurisdiction over its own nationals, a state might nonetheless resent
the implication that its administration of justice is insufficient. Alternatively,
a state might oppose establishment of nationality-based jurisdiction in U.S. law
on the grounds that the United States would use it to coerce other states to
relinquish jurisdiction over U.S. nationals suspected of committing a crime
abroad.
In general, however, other states are unlikely to object. Most states are not
likely to take offense at U.S. prosecution of U.S. nationals for crimes committed abroad, particularly if the state in which the crime occurred declines to
prosecute. United States indictment of a U.S. drug lord operating in Colombia
or Venezuela will not induce the same resentment that U.S. indictment of a
Colombian or Venezuelan would. The State Department has argued that such
an indictment of a U.S. national for a crime committed abroad might actually
benefit bilateral relations, because it might reduce pressure on host states to

163. See Stephen B. Swigert, Note, ExtraterritorialReach of ProposedFederal Criminal Code, 13
HARV. INT'L L.J. 346, 362 (1972) (arguing that nationality jurisdiction is appropriate because actions of
private nationals may affect foreign policy interests).
164. See WESTLAKE, supra note 18, at 253 (characterizing many British statutes with nationality
provisions as serving self-defense interests).

165. "[I]t has never been considered a violation of sovereignty for a state to apply its laws to its
nationals in the territory of another state even without the latter's consent." HENKiI ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 14, at 266.
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prosecute." The foreign state is even less likely to resent a U.S. prosecution
if it wants the U.S. national prosecuted but cannot do so.
In summary, there is a clear basis in international law for the exercise of
nationality-based criminal jurisdiction. The principle is accepted on the allegiance theory, though it derives more strength from a state's interest in controlling its own foreign policy. Foreign states could conceivably express policy
concerns about any expansion of U.S. criminal jurisdiction, but many such
states exercise nationality jurisdiction themselves. Any potential dispute over
the scope of jurisdiction can be minimized by carefully delimiting the scope
of nationality-based criminal jurisdiction. With this last concern in mind, Part
V examines the various shapes that criminal jurisdiction over U.S. nationals
abroad might take.
V. FASHIONING NATIONALITY-BASED CRIMINAL JURISDICTION

The United States should continue to rely primarily on other states to
prosecute U.S. nationals for crimes committed overseas. The alternative,
prosecuting all such crimes in U.S. courts, would impose an intolerable burden
on the resources of our criminal justice system and would offend foreign states.
Nevertheless, a discernible jurisdictional gap remains in U.S. criminal law.
To fill this gap, a federal statute should establish nationality-based criminal
jurisdiction over crimes committed abroad by U.S. nationals. Such a statute
must address several practical issues. The first and most significant issue is
the need to obtain evidence from abroad to support nationality-based prosecutions and to ensure that the defendant receives a fair trial. A second issue
is whether to authorize the exercise of jurisdiction in the absence of dual
criminality. A third issue is whether to authorize the exercise of jurisdiction
even when the foreign state is prepared to prosecute. A fourth issue is whether
such a statute should cover all crimes, including misdemeanors, or whether
it should include only more serious crimes.
A. Evidentiary and Confrontation Considerations
Although problems in procuring evidence from abroad were particularly
pronounced in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when intercontinental
travel and communication were much slower than today, 67 the U.S. Consti166. Hearingon CriminalJurisdiction,supra note 106, at 66 (statement of James H. Michel, Assistant
Legal Adviser, Department of State). There is, however, the possibility that the United States might put
"pressure" on host states not to prosecute.
167. See supra notes 21-22; S. R P. No. 1515, 56th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1900) (noting that attendance
of witnesses from Cuba could only be obtained "with great difficulty"); MOoRE, supra note 19, at 101 (as
result of distant prosecutions, "guilty men might occasionally be brought to justice; but innocent men,
charged with the commission of crimes in distant parts of the world, would be almost incapable of

Offenders Abroad
tution expressly contemplates that federal courts can extend jurisdiction over
criminal acts committed outside the United States.' 68 Article I provides that
'169
Congress may establish venue for crimes "not committed within any state,
and the early congresses enacted statutes on treason, piracy, and other crimes
committed outside the United States. The Congresses of the nineteenth century
pursued consular jurisdiction, but minimized evidentiary problems by establishing venue for the presiding U.S. court in the host state. 170
An advantage of extradition, as opposed to trial in the United States for
extraterritorial crimes, is that it does not require that witnesses be present,
since documentary proof is sufficient. 17 On occasion, Congress has explicitly
cited concerns about the right to confront one's accuser as a reason for rejecting nationality-based jurisdiction." However, the United States has already

overcome the confrontation problem in a variety of analogous situations. In
recent years, Congress has enacted criminal statutes with extraterritorial
effects, such as laws forbidding the importation of narcotics, the HostageTaking Act of 1984173, and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. 74 The Justice Department has successfully prosecuted violations of each of these statutes.

175

Nationality-based prosecutions might present more problems than effectsbased cases, since no aspect of a case may have affected the United States or

defending themselves. .. .")
(quoting GEORGE C. LEWIS, ON FOREIGN JURISDICTION AND THE EXTRADITION OF CRmINALs 29 (1859)).
168. George, supra note 14, at 629.
169. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.
3.
170. One commentator has suggested that the United States establish extraterritorial courts abroad with
jurisdiction concurrent with that of the host state. See Girard, supra note 40, at 511-19. This approach
would minimize confrontation problems but would require the consent of host states, which may believe
that it smacks of the old, imperialist consular jurisdiction. See Petitioners' Brief at 95-98, McElroy v.
United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 371 U.S. 281 (1960) (No. 59-21) (denouncing overseas courts as "new
extraterritoriality"), quoted in Girard, supra note 40, at 518. Even Girard acknowledges the possibility
that host states might object. Girard, supra note 40, at 518. He proposes extraterritorial courts only in those
countries hosting U.S. military personnel and their dependents. Id.
A more recent and exotic proposal would involve the establishment of an international criminal court,
but its purpose would apparently be limited to prosecution of terrorists. See generally BENIAMIN B.
FERENCZ, AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A STEP TOWARD WORLD PEACE-A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY AND ANALYSIS (1980). In theory, such a court could prosecute U.S. nationals when no state can
or will exercise jurisdiction over them, but in practice most of the existing problems would persist. A state,
including the United States, might decline to "extradite" to the international court if it did not view the U.S.
national's conduct as a crime, or if the U.S. national were a diplomat or a dependent of a soldier. More
importantly, the rules of such a court would probably not comply with U.S. constitutional standards. For
additional information on an international criminal court, see Michael P. Scharf, The JuryIs Still Out on
the Need for an InternationalCriminalCourt, 1991 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 135.
171. See 18 U.S.C. § 3190 (1988) (documentaryproof sufficient); U.S.-U.K. ExtraditionTreaty, supra
note 125 (same).
172. See S. REP. No. 1515, supra note 167 (regarding Cuba).
173. 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (1988).
174. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78ddl-2, 78ff (1988).
175. See, e.g., United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (hostage-taking); United States
v. Liebo, 923 F.2d 1308 (8th Cir. 1991) (Foreign Corrupt Practices Act).
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taken place in U.S. territory. In a drug-importation case, the defendant may
have had a collaborator in the United States who can be compelled to testify
in a U.S. court. But in a murder prosecution based on nationality, all witnesses
and evidence may be located abroad, and it may be difficult for either party
to locate much less produce them in court.
Physical and documentary evidence abroad can sometimes be obtained
through cooperation with the foreign state, a method more easily employed by
the prosecution than the defense. Litigants currently have a modest range of
devices through which they can request foreign legal assistance. Either party
can simply ask a foreign government or individual for assistance, which might
include the provision of documents or other physical evidence, the attendance
at trial of a witness, the taking of a deposition in the foreign state, or permission to conduct an investigation in the foreign state. The defense may have less
success persuading foreign police to help, and may have to rely on private
investigators (if it can afford to conduct a private investigation at all).
In addition, the parties can turn to the more formal device of letters
rogatory. 7 6 Letters rogatory are formal requests for judicial assistance from
a court in a foreign country. They are typically passed from the requesting
court to its state's foreign ministry, then to the requested state's foreign
ministry, and then to the foreign court, which establishes a commission to
carry out the request. A U.S. court can use letters rogatory at the request of
either party to ask a foreign state to provide physical and documentary evidence as a matter of comity, even if the requested state is not required by
treaty to do so.'" U.S. law permits the issuance of letters rogatory at the
preindictment phase, while foreign states may require the existence of a
proceeding more formal than a mere investigation.178 Letters rogatory are
very slow, however, because the letters must travel through several bureaucracies before they arrive at the foreign court. 179 Once there, the requests often
go unanswered for months or even years (if they are answered at all). 180
176. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1781-1783 (1988). See generally Heinrich Griitzner, InternationalJudicial
Assistance and Cooperationin CriminalMatter,in 2 TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 202-44
(M. Cherif Bassiouni & Ved P. Nanda eds., 1973).

177. 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (1988). Although letters rogatory statutes do not by their terms apply to
criminal proceedings, U.S. courts have found an "inherent" power to apply them. See United States v.
Reagan, 453 F.2d 165, 172 (6th Cir. 1971).
178. Compare Reagan, 453 F.2d at 173 (permitting use of letters rogatory at preindictment phase)
with In re Request for International Judicial Assistance, 49 Can. Crim. Cas. 2d 276 (Alta. Q.B. 1979)
(declining U.S. request for assistance at pretrial stage), rev'd on other grounds, 58 Can. Crim. Cas. 2d
274 (Alta. C.A. 1981).
179. See MUTUAL LEGAL ASsISTANcE TREATY CONCERNING THE CAYMAN ISLANDS, S. ExEc. REP.
No. 26, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 60 (1988) (quoting testimony of Mary V. Mochary, Principal Deputy Legal
Adviser, U.S. Department of State).
180. See, e.g., United States v. Bastanipour, 697 F.2d 170, 178 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460
U.S. 1091 (1983) (noting trial delay of several months while parties waited for letters rogatory addressed
to Iran, and that letters never produced any results); SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, LEoIS.
AcrsvrriEs RaP., S. REP. No. 30, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1991) (noting that letters rogatory produce
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Moreover, even if foreign officials cooperate with the prosecution or the
defense, they may not produce evidence that is admissible in a U.S. court.'
After the decision in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, however, it
seems unlikely that the Fourth Amendment will bar admission of evidence
obtained abroad.l'
Even if foreign cooperation to obtain necessary evidence is not possible,
domestic compulsion may still be available. The U.S. government, for example, has served subpoenas on corporations located in the United States for
'documents located in corporate branches or headquarters overseas.'1 4 This
type of compulsion can be useful when foreign law does not prohibit production in such circumstances. However, enforcing such a subpoena in the face
of contrary foreign law may be seen as a violation of foreign sovereignty. Such
compulsion also may be of only limited usefulness, since nationality-based
prosecutions of violent crimes often fail without a witness present at trial.
Securing the attendance of a witness from abroad, particularly one who is
recalcitrant, raises difficult problems. Either party can request attendance, and
either party can reimburse the witness for expenses incurred as a result of the
appearance. However, the government will almost certainly have more resources to devote to such efforts than the defense. Moreover, a defense request
carries less clout because a foreign state rarely has an interest in preserving
good relations with an individual criminal defendant. Using letters rogatory
can add to the apparent weight of a defense request, but even so, a foreign
state will probably not respond as helpfully as if the request had come from
the government prosecution.
The U.S. government has occasionally succeeded in persuading foreign
states to arrange for their own officials and private nationals to testify at
criminal proceedings in the United States.' Requests from the U.S. govern-

"limited results").
181. See Lee Paikin, Problemsof ObtainingEvidence in Foreign Statesfor Use in FederalCriminal
Prosecutions,22 CoLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 233, 239 (1984) (citing Fourth Amendment, Sixth Amendment, and evidentiary rules).

182. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
183. The Verdugo-Urquidez Court held that evidence obtained as a result of an unreasonable search
and seizure by U.S. and foreign agents abroad was nonetheless admissible, since the Fourth Amendment
applies only to persons who are part of the national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient
connection with the United States to be considered part of its community. Id. at 266. Evidence obtained
through unlawful searches by foreign officials was already admissible under the "silver platter" doctrine.

See, e.g., United States v. Rose, 570 F.2d 1358, 1361-62 (9th Cir. 1978) (allowing admission of evidence
seized by Canadian law enforcement officials). For criticism of Verdugo-Urquidez, see Andreas Lowenfeld,
U.S. Law EnforcementAbroad: The Constitution and InternationalLaw, Continued, 84 AM. J. INT'L L.

444, 491-93 (1990); see also Note, The ExtraterritorialApplicabilityofthe FourthAmendment, 102 HAtv.
L. REv. 1672 (1989).
184. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
185. See, e.g., United States v. Liebo, 923 F.2d 1308, 1308-10 (8th Cir. 1991) (U.S. government

arranged for officials of government of Niger to attend criminal trial of U.S. corporation indicted for
violations of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act).
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ment asking foreign states to persuade their nationals to testify in the U.S.
may, however, invite coercion or encourage human rights violations. To guard
against coercion, a U.S. court might question the witnesses themselvds, or at
least request a report from the government on how and why the witnesses
decided to testify.
If a recalcitrant witness is a U.S. national or a third-country national, the
prospects for securing his attendance may be slightly better since the requested
state can deport or expel nonnationals. These procedures, especially deportation, take time. If deportation or expulsion is not possible, then the possibility
of compelling the witness to attend diminishes significantly. "
Even if a foreign state is unwilling or unable to compel a witness to travel
abroad to testify, it can still compel that individual to appear before its own
courts. The Confrontation Clause, however, normally prohibits the use of
deposition testimony by the prosecution,", and evidentiary rules limit its use
by the defense.' In Ohio v. Roberts,' however, the Supreme Court held
that the use of prior trial testimony is permissible if the declarant is "unavailable" at the time of trial and the statements bear "indicia of reliability." 190
A U.S. court would likely consider a witness unavailable if he or she could
not be persuaded or compelled to attend. 19' Some suggest that foreign deposition procedures that resemble those of the United States might satisfy Sixth
Amendment standards." 2 Even U.S. depositions, however, are a far cry
from full-blown trial testimony since they carry fewer "indicia of reliability"
than prior trial testimony. In the United States, the witness is sworn in and
may be represented by counsel, but there is no judge or jury present, often no
vigorous cross-examination, and the atmosphere is less formal and perhaps less
likely to induce truth-telling than the solemn atmosphere of a courtroom. Still,
the Supreme Court's relaxed approach to confrontation problems in Roberts
suggests that use of depositions at trial will become more common.' 93
The difficulties encountered in obtaining evidence from abroad have led
the U.S. government to seek alternative methods. In recent years, it has
embarked on a campaign to make requests for evidence the subject of bilateral

186. States have the authority to transfer prisoners temporarily to other states in order for them to
testify. See Grfitnzer, supra note 176, at 212. Generally, however, it is a misuse of the term to speak of

the extradition of witnesses. Id. (noting that transfer of prisoners to testify abroad is "not an extradition").
187. See Paikin, supra note 181, at 241. But see McClelland, supra note 5, at 214 (arguing that
Supreme Court would permit use of deposition testimony).

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

See FED. R. EviD. 802 (hearsay rule).
448 U.S. 56 (1981).
L at 66.
See Paikin, supranote 181, at 242 (noting that U.S. courts have assessed unavailability leniently).
See id. at 243.
See, e.g., United States v. Johapoll, 739 F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1984) (admitting deposition at which

defense had opportunity to cross-examine); United States v. King, 552 F.2d 833 (9th Cir. 1976), cert.

denied, 430 U.S. 966 (1977) (admitting videotaped depositions of co-conspirators in Japan).
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treaties, known as Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs), designed to
procure documentary and testimonial evidence from abroad for use in domestic
prosecutions. 4 The MLAT procedure is designed to work more quickly than
letters rogatory since the MLATs impose an international legal obligation on
the requested state to respond, whereas letters rogatory can only request a
response. 195 The executive branch" reports that these treaties have been invaluable in obtaining a number of major convictions.196 The U.S. government

has negotiated a dozen MLATs, most of which are now in force.'97 Continued negotiation and use of MLATs remains a major priority of both Congress
and the Bush Administration. 9 8
Despite their advantages, one problem with MLATs is that they are not
designed for use by the defendant. The Justice Department has taken the
position that these treaties are law-enforcement tools for the benefit of the
prosecution only.' 99 Accordingly, some recent MLATs contain provisions
preventing their use by criminal defendants. 2" While some commentators
have suggested that these provisions may violate the defendant's due process
rights,2"' Congress has given its advice and consent to ratification of the
194. The United States has signed MLATs with eighteen states. Of these, eight are currently in force.
See SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, TREATY WITH THE BAHAMAS ON MUTuAL LEGAL AssIsTANCE INCRIMINAL MATTERS, S. EXEC. REP. No. 12, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); Treaty for Mutual
Legal Assistance, Dec. 9, 1987, U.S.-Mex., 27 1L.M. 443 (1988) [hereinafter U.S.-Mex. MLAT]; Treaty
Concerning Cayman Islands and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, July 3, 1986, U.S.-U.K.,
26 I.L.M. 536 (1987); Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Mar. 18, 1985, U.S.-Can.,
24 I.L.M. 1092 (1985) [hereinafter U.S.-Can. MLAT]; SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, MUTuAL
LEGAL ASSISTANCE TREATY WITH ITALY, S. EXEc. REP. No. 36, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-8 (1983); Treaty
on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, June 12, 1983, U.S.-Neth., T.I.A.S. No. 10,734; Treaty
on Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, June 7, 1979, U.S.-Turk., 32 U.S.T.
3111; Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 25, 1973, U.S.-Switz., 27 U.S.T. 2019
[hereinafter U.S.-Switz. MLAT].
195. For a general description of MLATs, see S. REP. No. 30, supra note 180, at 14-17.
196. See S. ExEc. REP. No. 26, supra note 179, at 57-58 (excerpting hearing) (testimony of Mary
V. Mochary, Principal Deputy Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State, April 20, 1988). See also 135
CONG. REc. S13,880 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1989) (remarks of Sen. Kerrey) (noting dramatic effectiveness
of MLATs in obtaining bank records, depositions, recordings of telephone conversations, and appearance
of witnesses from Switzerland, Italy, and Turkey in recent Pizza Connection case).
197. See S. REP. No. 30, supranote 180, at 14-17 (describing status of existing MLATs). Some states
have also entered into multilateral arrangements for mutual legal assistance. See, e.g., European Convention
on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Apr. 20, 1959, Europ. T.S. No. 30 (entered into force June
12, 1962).
198. See, e.g., HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFmAIRS, MONEY LAUNDERING AMENDMENTS OF 1991,
H.R. REP. NO. 28, pt. 2, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1991) (urging continued negotiation and use of
MLATs).
199. See S. ExEc. REP. No. 26, supra note 179, at 10-11 (technical analysis of U.S.-Cayman Islands
MLAT).
200. See, e.g., U.S.-Mex. MLAT, supranote 194, art. 1(5); U.S.-Can. MLAT, supra note 194, art.
11(4).
201. See, e.g., S. EXEc. REP. No. 26, supra note 179, at 164-65 (reprinting hearing testimony of
Robert L. Pisani, June 14, 1988) (arguing that MLATs should be available to defendants for depositions
and compulsory process); id. at 167 (testimony of Bruce Zagaris) (similar). See also Michael Isikoff, Cartel
Defendants'D.C.Lanyer-Ex-ProsecutorAngersFormerJusticeDepartment Colleagues, WASH. POST,
Oct. 2, 1989, at Al (reporting that former Justice Department official argued that MLATs should be
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treaties without objecting to these provisions." While no court has yet held
that the exclusive-use provisions are unconstitutional, the U.S. Constitution
may require that the defense have at least limited access to the MLAT mechanism, particularly if such access is necessary to obtain exculpatory evidence." 0 It seems unlikely, however, that the Constitution requires that defendants have full and free access to the MLAT process, any more than it
requires full access to other investigatory resources of the government, such
as the FBI or Interpol.
Whether or not constitutionally required, justice requires that the defendant
have at least limited access to MLATs. If the government continues to negotiate exclusive-use provisions, the courts may have other means of ensuring
some access for the defense. At the very least, the defense is entitled to
discovery of exculpatory material uncovered by the prosecution's MLAT
requests. A broader scope of discovery may be granted depending on the type
of case and the MLAT in question. In one case, for example, a federal district
court insisted that the U.S. government either make an MLAT request on
behalf of the defense or dismiss the case.2 '° The Justice Department acquiesced and made the request. The U.S.-Switzerland MLAT, moreover, provides
that the defense can ask the court to order the government to make a request
on behalf of the defense.' 5
The defense may not always wish to use an MLAT request, however,
because making a request through the government may reveal trial strategy. Even if MLATs can be used fairly by both sides, there is still the
predicament of the Confrontation Clause, since the scope of assistance under
MLATs, while somewhat broader than under letters rogatory, still does not
oblige foreign states to produce witnesses for trial.
Taken as a whole, the evidentiary obstacles to prosecutions based on
nationality jurisdiction resemble the obstacles that confront successful prosecutions based on other forms of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction, such as
territorial-effects jurisdiction and protective jurisdiction. A prosecution for

available to defense as well as prosecution).

202. See, e.g., S. EXEC. REP. No. 8, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1989) (reporting favorably on
MLATs). Even the most conservative members of Congress have nonetheless expressed concern about the
constitutional rights of defendants prosecuted with the assistance of MLATs. See, e.g., 135 CONG. REc.
S13,881, 13,882-84 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1987) (remarks of Senator Helms).
203. But see Alan Ellis & Robert L. Pisani, The United States Treaties on Mutual Assistance In
Criminal Matters:A ComparativeAnalysis, 19 INT'L LAW. 189, 221 (1985) ("[I]t is not at all clear that
the government could be compelled to make a request for information that contained exculpatory evidence.").
204. United States v. Sindona, 636 F.2d 792 (2d Cir. 1980), cen. denied, 451 U.S. 912 (1981). The

published reports of the case do not discuss this procedure, but apparently it did take place. See Ellis &
Pisani, supra note 203, at 221-22 n.181; William S. Kenney, Structuresand Methods of Internationaland

Regional Cooperationin Penal Matters, 29 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 39, 65 n.165 (1984).
205. See U.S.-Switz. MLAT, supra note 194, art. 28(2).
206. See Ellis & Pisani, supra note 203, at 221.
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conspiracy to import narcotics may rely on physical evidence obtained by an
MLAT request. A prosecution for offshore money laundering may rely on
documentary evidence obtained through letters rogatory or less formal means
of interstate cooperation. No obvious reasons bar nationality-based prosecutions
from using these evidence-gathering techniques. While evidentiary problems
may bar some nationality-based prosecutions, the same is true of prosecutions
based on other forms of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
B. Dual Criminality
A second difficult question is whether the United States should establish
and exercise jurisdiction over U.S. nationals abroad for conduct that is criminal
in the United States but not in the foreign state. The host state might argue that
prosecution by United States is inappropriate and offensive in such circumstances. Alternatively, the host state might point to the dual-criminality rule
imposed by most extradition treaties, which limits extradition to offenses
punishable as felonies in both nations.2 7 The host state might argue, as some
commentators have, that this dual-criminality requirement should extend to any
prosecution by a state exercising nationality-based criminal jurisdiction,
whether or not the prosecution involves extradition."'
In practice, the absence of dual criminality is rare, particularly for crimes
that are serious enough to warrant the exercise of nationality-based jurisdiction. 2" Inevitably, some serious crimes of violence will be defined more
narrowly by some states than by others, but the dual-criminality doctrine
merely requires the crimes to be "substantially similar." 210 As a result, states
have not often confronted the question of whether a nationality-based prosecution must satisfy the dual-criminality requirement, especially when the case
involves no foreign legal assistance.
The dearth of state practice makes it premature to infer a dual-criminality
requirement for all such prosecutions. If anything, international practice
suggests the opposite conclusion. Outside the context of extradition and mutual
legal assistance, there are few examples in which a state has foregone an
extraterritorial prosecution because the territorial state objected on dual crimi207. See, e.g., U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty, supra note 125, art. III(1).
208. See 2 M. CHERIF BASsIouNI & VED P. NANDA, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW § 3.3 (1973)
(arguing that requirement of dual criminality applies or should apply in at least some circumstances);
Swigert, supra note 163, at 363.
209. States are unwilling to incur the expense of an extraterritorial prosecution for a minor offense.
See Hearing on CriminalJurisdiction,supra note 106, at 52 (statement of Benjamin Forman, Assistant
General Counsel, Department of Defense) (noting Justice Department's reluctance to establish jurisdiction
over "minor crimes').
210. G. Nicholas Hermanetal.,Double CriminalityandComplex Cases, in INTERNATIONALCRIMINAL
LAW: A GUIDE TO UNITED STATES PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE 365, 367-74 (Ved P. Nanda & M. Cherif
Bassiouni eds., 1987) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW].
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nality grounds.211 Even in cases involving mutual legal assistance, the trend
seems to be away from requiring dual criminality.212 Nor do states appear
to impose such restrictions in their own municipal law. For example, states
do not condition their exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction on the existence
of a similar criminal statute in the host country. A state might well forbid
prosecution if another state has prosecuted for the same offense, on a double
jeopardy or autrefois convict theory, but not if the other state has chosen not
to criminalize the conduct at all.
Although rare, cases will arise in which dual criminality is lacking. Two
states may define a crime of violence so differently that it fails the "substantially similar" test. One state's definition of rape, for example, may exclude
spousal rape. Some nonviolent offenses, such as the U.S. crimes of racketeering1 and continuing criminal enterprise, 1 4 raise similar problems." 5 In
addition, political offenses will sometimes be defined in one state but not in
the other. Cases such as these do raise the question whether a nationality-based
prosecution is possible when the territorial state does not view the conduct as
criminal.
A dual-criminality requirement serves an important function in extradition
and mutual legal assistance cases. It frees the requested state from any obligation to actively participate in the prosecution of a fugitive for conduct that the
requested state does not criminalize. A state can argue that mandatory extradition or assistance would require it to violate its own public policy.2" 6 For this
reason, the dual-criminality requirement has been written into many modern
extradition and mutual legal assistance treaties.2 17 But the United States and
other members of the international community are moving away from dual
criminality even when the prosecuting state requests judicial assistance from
a state that does not criminalize the conduct at issue. Of the six MLATs
recently ratified by the United States, three contain no dual-criminality require211. See BASSioUNi & NANDA, supra note 208, § 3.3.
212. See, e.g., S. EXEC. REP. No. 13, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. (1989) (noting that MLAT with Thailand
does not contain dual-criminality requirement); SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, TREATY WITH
CANADA ON MUTUAL LEGAL AssISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTIERS, S. ExEc. REP. No. 10, 101st Cong.,

1st Sess. (1989) (same); SENATE COMM. ON FoREIGN RELATIONS, MUTUAL LEGAL ASSIsTANCE TREATY
wia MEXICO, S. EXEC. REP. NO. 9, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 11-12 (1989) (same).
213. See Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988).
214. See Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 848(b) (1988).
215. See Herman et al., supranote 210, at 374-91 (noting that foreign states might punish predicate
offenses but not aggregation of such offenses).
216. But cf. BASSIoUNI & NANDA, supra note 208, § 4.1 (arguing that dual criminality is appropriate
only when requested state is required to participate in execution of judgment, or when requested state is

required to execute searches or seizures on behalf of requesting state, since searches and seizures interfere
with third parties to much greater extent than do other acts of assistance such as interrogations and service
of process).
217. See, e.g., Treaty of Extradition, Sept. 24, 1984, U.S.-Italy, T.I.A.S. No. 10,837; TREATY WITH
BELGIUM ON MUTuAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN CRaIMNAL MATTERS, S. EXEC. REP. No. 11, 101st Cong.,
1st Sess. 3 (1989).
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ment at all, two require dual criminality only for certain crimes, and only one
requires dual criminality in all cases.2'8 Apparently not all states find it unacceptable to provide assistance in prosecuting a crime not included in their
domestic criminal code.219
A dual-criminality requirement seems much less rational when the host
state is not required to assist the state undertaking prosecution. Although the
host state might, in arguing for a dual-criminality requirement, complain of
an affront to its dignity and resent the implication that its criminal law is
inadequate, these complaints are essentially diplomatic in nature and can be
handled best through diplomatic channels. The territorial state could, for
example, express its views to the prosecuting state's foreign ministry, or even
in some cases, to the presiding court. In any event, the host state may refuse
to assist in prosecutions with which it takes exception.
The defendant might also argue for dual criminality by claiming that it is
unfair to prosecute an individual for conduct undertaken abroad if that conduct
is legal in the host state: that it is unjust to subject an individual to two potentially conflicting sets of law. Criminal law, however, tends to impose negative
rather than affirmative duties. It is thus unlikely that one state's criminal law
will direct an individual to act in a specific way, while another state's criminal
law directs him to act in a contradictory manner.' 2 In those rare cases in
which conflicting obligations do apply to a U.S. national abroad, U.S. law
should accept the foreign obligation as a valid defense to enforcement of a
conflicting U.S. criminal law.
Rather than conflict, criminal laws usually differ only in the sense that one
state imposes higher standards of conduct than the other. If a state imposes
high standards of conduct on an individual and presumes that the individual
is aware of those standards, then it is not unreasonable to expect the individual
to abide by the same standards when abroad, even if the standards in the
foreign country are lower. Requiring U.S. travelers to adhere to a higher
standard of conduct than those around them is neither unfair nor unusual.

218. The mutual legal assistance treaties with Mexico, Canada, and Thailand do not require dual

criminality, while the treaties with the Cayman Islands and the Bahamas require dual criminality for some
offenses. The treaty with Belgium requires dual criminality for all offenses because Belgian municipal law
demands it. See S. REP. No. 30, supra note 180, at 14-17 (discussing status of existing MLATs).
219. Indeed, the several states extradite fugitives to each other even when the offense in question is
not criminalized in the asylum state. See 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (1988) (requiring only that conduct be criminal

in requesting state); Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, WASH. REV. CoDE ANN.
(similar).

§ 10.88.220 (West 1990)

220. One exception has grown out of U.S. efforts to enforce subpoenas for documents located
overseas. A number of foreign states have enacted "blocking statutes" imposing criminal penalties on
corporations that produce such documents. Thus corporate defendants have sometimes found themselves

caught between two sovereigns, one demanding production of documents, the other forbidding production
of the documents, and both threatening criminal penalties for noncompliance. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury

Proceedings, United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384, 1388-91 (11th Cir. 1982). Statutes
on treason and draft registration may also give rise to conflicting obligations, but such cases are unusual.
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Foreign states routinely subject U.S. nationals to laws different from those
applied to the host state's own nationals.
In addition, extraterritorial jurisdiction is founded on the belief that the law
of the state in which conduct occurs does not always govern that conduct. For
example, violation of a law grounded in local religious custom will offend only
the local sovereign and will subject the offender only to local law. Other
conduct will offend both the host state and another state, thus subjecting the
offender to two or more sets of law. For example, narcotics trafficking will
offend the state of exportation as well as the state of importation. Still other
conduct will not offend the host state but will offend a foreign state, and thus
will subject the offender only to foreign law. Treason and espionage are two
examples.
While the host state should not have a legal obligation to subject a visitor
to a foreign prosecution that will violate her human rights, the imposition of
a dual-criminality standard is not necessary to guard against this problem. If
the host state is asked to extradite an individual for a "political offense," the
host state is not required to comply." 1 The term "political offense" is defined
broadly to cover pure political offenses aimed directly at the government, such
as treason, sedition, espionage, prohibited speech, unlawful assembly, and
unauthorized departure, as well as relative political offenses, which are crimes
such as murder and assault that are linked to a political act or cause.' This
political offense exception protects the requested individual's human rights,
protects the right to promote political change generally, and permits the
requested state to avoid taking sides in political conflict internal to the requesting state.' In addition, any state may deny a request for evidence or other
judicial assistance if it relates to a prosecution for a political offense. 4 Finally, states may pursue the limited remedies provided by international human
rights law. These remedies may include resort to the International Court of
Justice, regional human rights tribunals such as the European Court of Human
Rights, U.N. organizations such as the Security Council, bilateral trade
sanctions, and perhaps humanitarian intervention.'
221. See, e.g., Convention of Extradition, Dec. 10, 1962, U.S.-Israel, 14 U.S.T. 1707 (political

offense exception); Commission on Int'l Terrorism of the Am. Branch of the Int'l Law Ass'n, Report on
Efforts to Revise U.S. Legislationon Extraditionas It May Impact on CombatingInternationalTerrorism,
in INTERNATIONAL CRUMINAL LAW, supra note 210, at 333, 353-59 (noting that political offense exception
is found in every U.S. extradition treaty).
222. See Sapiro, supranote 90, at 660 n.33. Many states also refuse to extradite unless the requesting
state provides assurances that the fugitive will not be put to death. See, e.g., U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty,
supra note 125.
223. See Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 793 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882 (1986).
224. See U.S.-Switz. MLAT, supra note 194; Griitzner, supra note 176, at 222.
225. See U.N. SCOR RESoLurioNs Arm DEcisIONs, 32d Sess., 2045th mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc.

S/INF/33 (1977) (sanctions against South Africa); Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)at 44-45 (1989)
(holding that extradition of fugitive to United States would violate European Convention on Human Rights
because United States had not provided firm assurances that fugitive would not be put on death row). See
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In sum, Congress should not limit nationality-based criminal jurisdiction
to cases in which the host state recognizes the conduct in question as criminal.
Such a limitation would allow U.S. nationals to escape punishment for conduct
that U.S. law recognizes as criminal. A U.S. national who is accused of a
serious crime such as rape should not be exempted from U.S. criminal law
merely because the state in which the conduct occurred does not view such
conduct as a criminal offense.
C. Deference to ForeignProsecution
The United States should exercise nationality-based jurisdiction only if the
host state is unwilling or unable to prosecute. Such an exercise of self-restraint
would honor the most fundamental principle of criminal jurisdiction, which
is that a state has the primary right to enforce its own criminal laws within its
own territory. 6 It would also comport with long-standing U.S. policy to
permit extradition of U.S. nationals to foreign countries. 7 The establishment
of concurrent jurisdiction and a primary right to exercise jurisdiction in the
host state would reduce the number of potential conflicts. 2"
The mechanics of such a scheme, however, still pose some problems. A
policy of deference to the foreign state will work if the foreign state finds and
prosecutes the U.S. offender before the United States can do so. If the United
States requests extradition after the foreign prosecution, both the offender and
the requested state could contest extradition on the grounds of non bis in idem.
Alternatively, if indicted after returning to the United States, the U.S. offender
could presumably plead autrefois convict.
If, however, the U.S. offender is found first in the United States, the
executive branch might be tempted to disregard the foreign state's interest in
prosecuting, particularly if the foreign state is unaware of the offender's
presence in the United States. To avoid this problem, the statute establishing
nationality jurisdiction should include a deference provision requiring the
executive to present evidence that the foreign state will not prosecute, and

generally RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 703 cmts. & reporters' notes (discussing remedies for violation

of human rights obligations).
Some states, including the United States, may also provide tort and other remedies to individuals whose
rights have been violated. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (remedies provided
by Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1988)).
226. Statistics gathered by the Department of Defense suggest that civilian dependents of U.S. military
personnel prosecuted by foreign states receive lighter sentences than they would receive for comparable
offenses prosecuted in U.S. courts. See 1969 SOFA Hearing, supra note 111, at 18 (statements of Sen.
Ervin and Gen. Parker).
227. HARvARD RESEARCH, supra note 14, at 128.
228. George, supra note 14, at 637; see Hearing on CriminalJurisdiction, supra note 106, at 64
(statement of James H. Michel, Assistant Legal Adviser, Department of State) (reporting that State
Department supports such deference).
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should allow a court to rule on the sufficiency of that evidence.2 9 In many
cases it would be easy for a court to evaluate objective evidence showing that
a foreign prosecution is impossible. If, for example, the offender were found
in the United States, and no extradition treaty existed, or if an existing treaty
prohibited extradition of U.S. nationals, the prosecution could present this
information to the court. The executive could also present evidence showing
that a foreign prosecution is barred either by a statute of limitations or because
the suspect enjoyed diplomatic immunity. Prosecutors could also follow current
extradition practice and present a State Department affidavit and a copy of a
diplomatic note stating the foreign state's lack of interest in prosecuting.
Australia has adopted an alternative procedure and established a bright-line
rule to determine whether the foreign state can prosecute. Under the Extradition Act of 1988, Australia retains extraterritorial jurisdiction whenever it
declines to extradite a fugitive on the grounds that the suspect is an Australian
national." A U.S. nationality statute, however, should allow prosecution in
a broader range of circumstances-whenever it can be demonstrated that the
host state will not prosecute, for whatever reason.
Although complex problems might arise under such a broad scope of
jurisdiction, the problems would be no different than the problems that currently arise in extradition cases. One of the troubling possibilities is that the United
States might use its economic and political clout to coerce a state into relinquishing jurisdiction. If the requested state presents a diplomatic note to the
U.S. government disavowing intention to prosecute, the U.S. court can do little
to question the methods used to obtain the concession. After all, some aspects
of foreign policy are the exclusive domain of the executive. The same problem
exists in extradition relations in that the executive may pressure a state to
extradite rather than prosecute a fugitive. In some cases, foreign intent might
be genuinely ambiguous, which raises the possibility that the court will embarrass the executive by rejecting its assertion that the host state will not prosecute. The potential for embarrassment, however, seems no greater than in an
extradition case. In sum, deference to the host state's primary right to exercise
territorial jurisdiction will prevent jurisdictional conflicts with the host state
and will not frustrate the operation of nationality-based criminal jurisdiction.
D. Other Considerations
For practical and political reasons, a statute establishing nationality-based
criminal jurisdiction should limit its application to serious crimes of violence
and nonviolent felonies, such as fraud, that most states criminalize. This

229. See, e.g., Filarfiga,630 F.2d at 892.
230. See Extradition Act of 1988, § 45 (Austl., Mar. 9, 1988).
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approach would minimize problems of dual criminality and avoid burdening
the Justice Department with the responsibility for prosecuting U.S. nationals
for minor offenses committed overseas."
In addition, nationality jurisdiction should be established only at the federal
level. Although the individual states do have some power to regulate extraterritorial crime, 2 the federal government has a prevailing interest in establishing a unified national practice in international criminal law. For this reason,
the federal government handles international extradition even when the party
3
requesting extradition is one of the individual states.?
Finally, a nationality-based statute should limit itself to crimes not already
prosecutable under some other theory of extraterritorial jurisdiction, such as
the territorial-effects principle. Conspiracy to import narcotics from abroad,
for example, is already punishable by the United States under the territorialeffects principle. Adding a redundant nationality-based element would only
augment the impression that the United States is abusing its exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
VI. CONCLUSION

The United States, the crusading champion of extraterritorial jurisdiction,
continues to reject one of the least controversial forms of extraterritorial
criminal jurisdiction, nationality-based jurisdiction. As a result, U.S. nationals
commit serious crimes overseas and escape prosecution.
A nationality-based criminal statute would establish jurisdiction over U.S.
offenders abroad whenever the host state does not prosecute them and whenever the United States would not otherwise have jurisdiction over them. The
statute would encompass a variety of serious crimes committed by U.S.
nationals abroad, including murder, rape, arson, robbery, assaults, kidnapping,
and fraud. Although such jurisdiction would be invoked most often in connection with crimes committed by civilian dependents of military personnel
stationed overseas, it would also allow the United States to prosecute diplomats
and others who cannot be extradited to, or prosecuted by, the host state.
Nationality-based jurisdiction would conform with existing international
and domestic law. Because international law clearly recognizes nationality
jurisdiction, foreign states should not object to its adoption by the United
States, especially if the Unites States limits its exercise of nationality-based

231. The Justice Department has expressed concern about the added burden of nationality-based
prosecutions in the past. See Hearing on Criminal Jurisdiction, supra note 106, at 52 (statement of
Benjamin Forman, Assistant General Counsel, Department of Defense).
232. See George, supra note 14, at 617.
233. See John E. Harris, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Procedure for Requesting International Extradition
(1989) (unpublished, on file with author).
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jurisdiction to those cases in which the host state does not prosecute. Moreover, the international legal system, which values international cooperation in
law enforcement, has an interest in deterring and prosecuting crimes that
currently are not prosecuted by any state.
This is not to suggest that the United States should expand its extraterritorial jurisdiction in other areas. On the contrary, the United States often seems
too eager to exercise jurisdiction over foreign nationals for conduct that only
incidentally affects U.S. interests. Nevertheless, the United States should take
more responsibility for the crimes committed by its nationals abroad.

